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It has been found that both depressed patients and patients who have recovered from 
depression report more rumination and hold more meta-cognitive beliefs about the 
benefits of rumination than never-depressed controls.  Furthermore, it is suggested 
that a ruminative cognitive style predicts the onset, length and severity of depressive 
episodes.  Within an ACT (Acceptance and Commitment Therapy) perspective on 
depression, it is suggested that rumination in depression is a verbal reason-giving 
behaviour used to „solve‟ the problem of depressed mood.  However, it is proposed 
that an individual‟s fusion with these verbal reasons (i.e. cognitive fusion) 
perpetuates rumination and impedes the adoption of more functional behaviours.    
The aim of this study is to investigate the relationships between depression, 
rumination, cognitive fusion and positive beliefs about rumination.  
Method 
A between-groups design was used comparing currently depressed adults (n = 26), 
recovered depressed adults (n = 21) and never depressed adults (n = 27) on a battery 
of self-report measures for depressive symptomatology, rumination, positive beliefs 
about rumination and cognitive fusion.  Data were analysed using ANOVAs, post 
hoc comparisons, and path analysis: an extension of multiple regression. 
Results 
Significant differences were found in rumination and cognitive fusion between all 
three groups, with higher levels of rumination and cognitive fusion found in both the 
currently depressed and recovered depressed groups compared to never depressed 
controls.  Significant differences in positive beliefs about rumination were found 
only between the currently depressed group and the never depressed group.  Results 
also indicated that depression severity was best predicted by rumination and 
cognitive fusion rather than positive beliefs about rumination.  Furthermore, the 
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relationships between the variables of cognitive fusion and rumination (β = 0.76, p < 
.001), and cognitive fusion and depression (β = 0.66, p < .001), were stronger than 
the relationships between any of the other variables included in this study. 
Discussion 
Overall, the findings support the suggestion that cognitive fusion be considered in the 
conceptualisation of ruminative processes and depression.  The results suggest that in 
individuals who have recovered from depression and are no longer clinically 
depressed, a difference in cognitive processes such as rumination and cognitive 
fusion remains.  This may indicate that cognitive fusion is not secondary to 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Within this chapter, depression, rumination, and the relationship between them, will 
be explored.  A variety of theoretical models for these processes will be introduced 
and revisited throughout the introduction, with reference made to their clinical 
application.  Within this exploration, particular focus will be given to two specific 
psychological treatments for depression and the theoretical models underpinning 
them: metacognitive therapy (MCT; Wells, 1995) which is underpinned by the self-
regulatory executive function model (S-REF; Wells & Matthews, 1994, 1996), and 
acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT; Hayes et al., 1999) which is underpinned 
by relational frame theory (RFT; Hayes et al., 2001).  Cognitive processes which are 
proposed by these models to be implicated in depression and rumination will also be 
introduced.  In particular, the roles of metacognitive beliefs and cognitive fusion will 
be explored.  In each revisitation of the theoretical models and these cognitive 
processes, the implications on our understanding of the relationship between 
rumination and depression will be explored in further depth, and this will lead toward 
the concluding rationale for the current empirical study. 
 
1.1 Depression 
„Depression‟ is a term which covers a wide range of mood disorders and, as such, 
variations in the definition of depression can lead to confusion when applying 
research findings to clinical practice.  It is therefore imperative to have a clear 
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conceptualisation of the specific disorder being investigated at the outset.  This will 
now be explored further.  
 
1.1.1 Definition of depression 
The term „depression‟ with regard to mood or emotional state is reported to have 
appeared as early as 1665, when it meant a general lowering of mood or spirits 
(Kanter et al., 2008).  However, over time the term depression has come to be used 
to describe a specific psychological disorder.  According to the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders Fourth Edition Text Revisions (DSM-IV-TR; 
APA, 2000) mood disorders can be separated into two main categories, Depressive 
Disorders, i.e. unipolar depression, and Bipolar Disorders.  Within the category of 
Depressive Disorders further distinctions are made, and separate classifications for 
Major Depressive Disorder, Dysthymic Disorder, and Depressive Disorder Not 
Otherwise Specified are included.  The term „Major Depressive Disorder‟ was first 
selected by the American Psychiatric Association for a particular cluster of 
symptoms in the 1980 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Third 
Edition (DSM-III) and has since become widely used.  As with historical definitions 
of „depression‟, lowered affect or dysphoria remains the primary feature of Major 
Depressive Disorder (MDD).  However, a range of additional possible symptoms are 
also included, such as sleep and appetite changes, loss of interest in activities 
(anhedonia), fatigue, restlessness, concentration problems, feelings of guilt and 
hopelessness, and suicidal ideation.  MDD is indicated if at least five of a possible 
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nine symptoms is reported to be present over a minimum of a two week period, and 
at least one of the symptoms experienced is depressed mood or anhedonia most of 
the day, nearly every day, over that time-frame.  MDD is not indicated if the 
symptoms are due to a recent bereavement or are the result of the physiological 
effects of substance use or another general medical condition. 
MDD is estimated to be the most common depressive diagnosis in terms of lifetime 
prevalence rates (Kessler et al., 1994) and the lifetime risk of suicide in those 
experiencing MDD has been suggested to be as high as 6 per cent, compared to 1.3 
per cent in the general population (Inskip et al., 1998).  However, it is acknowledged 
that the diagnosis of Depressive Disorder simply represents a convenient grouping of 
a cluster of symptoms (somatic, emotional, cognitive and behavioural) and the 
presence and nature of these symptoms varies considerably across people with the 
same diagnosis (Lindal & Steffanson, 1991).  With the parsing of Depressive 
Disorder into several categories, such as MDD, a medical model may consider there 
to be potentially different aetiologies and treatment implications for each.  However, 
from a behaviour-analytic perspective, depression is seen not as several distinct 
disorders, nor as a syndrome, but as a phenomenon of chronic experience of sadness 
which varies greatly in time course and has several associated symptoms which also 
vary considerably in their severity and impact for different individuals (Kanter et al., 
2008).  Although for the purpose of this study the specific diagnostic category of 
MDD (single episode or recurrent) has been used to screen for eligibility of 
participants into the „currently depressed‟ and „recovered depressed‟ groups, this was 
simply as a means of ensuring the samples were representative of those typically 
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seen within a clinical setting and to communicate clearly the type of symptoms 
experienced by those participants. 
 
1.1.2 Prevalence of depression 
The magnitude of the rates of depression has been well reported over recent years.  
For example, recent epidemiological data from across six European countries found 
that almost 7 per cent of the population report experiencing major depression over 
the past six months (Lepine et al., 1997).  Furthermore, over the course of their 
lifetime, it is predicted that more than 15 per cent of the general population will 
experience an episode of depression (National Collaborating Centre for Mental 
Health, 2010).  Indeed, the prevalence of depression is such that it has been referred 
to as the “common cold” of outpatient populations, with approximately one in four 
women and one in ten men seeking treatment for depression at some point in their 
lives (Kanter et al., 2008).   However, it is known that people who are experiencing 
depression, like others with mental health difficulties, are reluctant to seek treatment.  
Only just over half will seek treatment for their depression symptoms, with the 
majority doing so from their primary care physician (Kessler et al., 1994).  Yet even 
with this low proportion seeking treatment, depression remains the third most 
common reason cited for consultation in general practice in the UK (National 
Collaborating Centre for Mental Health, 2010).  Depression therefore represents a 
significant issue for the National Health Service and it is predicted this will not ease 
in future decades.  Indeed, it is estimated by the World Health Organisation that by 
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2030 depression will be the second leading cause of disease burden worldwide, 
following HIV (Mathers & Loncar, 2005).  Unsurprisingly, depression has been the 
focus of much research activity over the past decades and issues of recurrence within 
depression and of treatment resistance have been highlighted. 
 
1.1.3 Recovery and relapse 
It is known that in terms of the average duration of episodes of depression, there is 
great variability.  However, it is broadly reported that approximately 25 per cent of 
episodes of major depression are recovered within one month, 50 per cent recover 
within three months, 15 to 39 per cent are still depressed one year from symptom 
onset and 22 per cent of cases remain depressed at two years (Williams, 1997).  
Furthermore, even after multiple treatment interventions, as many as 10 per cent of 
depressed patients remain depressed (Amsterdam et al., 2001).  It is also known that 
of those that recover from an episode of depression, 50 to 75 per cent will experience 
another episode within two years (Williams, 1997) and for those with a history of 
two or more episodes this risk is increased to 70 to 80 per cent (Consensus 
Development Panel, 1985).  Evidently then, depression is experienced as a chronic 
relapsing condition. 
Although a wealth of treatments for depression exists, there clearly remains scope for 
improving treatment outcomes.  A recent meta-analysis (de Maat et al., 2006) looked 
at 10 treatment outcome studies and found equivalent remission rates for 
antidepressant medication and psychotherapy of around 37 per cent.  However, at 
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follow up, relapse rates for those treated with antidepressant medication was 57 per 
cent and for those treated with psychotherapy was 24 per cent.  These findings 
suggest that although psychotherapy may sometimes contribute to a form of 
protection against recurrence and relapse for depression, for the majority of people 
treated this is not the case: most do not recover and, of those who do, a significant 
proportion relapse.  This finding is significant.  As well as the personal burden to 
individuals, this also has clear implications for the social and economic burden 
imposed by depression.   
Theories regarding the onset and chronic relapsing condition of depressive disorders 
have been developed from cognitive, behavioural and neurobiological perspectives.  
In accordance, treatment approaches to depression have varied in both their 
underlying theoretical model and mode of delivery.  An exploration of some of the 
broad historical developments in the treatment of depression follows. 
 
1.1.4 Historical developments in the treatment of depression 
Treatments for depression have evolved through the ages, often informed by the 
prevalent understanding of the aetiology of depression at the time.  In early ancient 
Greek and Roman accounts of depression, the term „melancholia‟ was used, with 
explanations for its development ranging from physical explanations, such as 
Hippocrates account of excess levels of black bile in the spleen, to psychological 
explanations such as Cicero‟s suggestion that violent rage, fear and grief cause 
melancholia.  The expansion of both these biological and psychological models of 
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depression has evolved over the centuries, eventually leading to the prevalent 
treatment models of more recent years. 
Pharmacological treatment 
Since the 1950s there has been a proliferation of the biological model of depression, 
in which it is hypothesised that depression is caused by chemical imbalance of brain 
neurotransmitters.  This medical model of depression has supported the development 
and promotion of pharmacotherapy in the treatment of depression, in particular of 
developments in antidepressant medication.  Antidepressants are normally 
recommended in first-line treatment of patients whose depression is of at least 
moderate severity (National Collaborating Centre for Mental Health, 2010).  It is 
reported that the prescription of antidepressants has been rising over the past two 
decades, with 3.53 million prescriptions being dispensed in Scotland in 2006, as 
compared to 1.16 million being dispensed in 1992 (Information Services Division 
Scotland, 2009).  However, as discussed previously, although beneficial for many, 
outcome studies suggest pharmacological treatment is not always effective in treating 
depression in the longer-term and alternative treatments are required. 
Psychological treatment 
Parallel to the development of the biological model, a broad range of psychological 
treatments for psychopathology have been developed over the years, each with 
differing theoretical backgrounds and implications in the treatment of depression.  At 
the turn of the twentieth century, psychoanalysis was relatively dominant and was 
only gradually challenged by behaviourism and then, from about the 1970s onwards, 
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by humanistic and cognitive therapies (Feltham, 2007).  The growth in different 
treatment models has since escalated and it has been calculated that towards the end 
of the twentieth century over 400 named therapeutic approaches existed (Feltham, 
1997).  However, within this vast number, several therapies have stemmed from the 
two broad strands of cognitive therapy and behaviourism.  Aspects of these models 
have been frequently revised, developed and at times merged, in an attempt to gain 
greater understanding of psychopathology and psychological processes.   Indeed the 
processes explored within this study (rumination, metacognition and cognitive 
fusion) all fall broadly within these two strands.  In order to provide a context for 
exploring the links between these processes, a brief summary of the treatment models 
from which they stem follows. 
 
1.1.5 Treatment models 
1.1.5.1 Cognitive Therapies 
Cognitive processes became increasingly explored in the mid twentieth century and 
cognitive theory began to separate away from Skinnerian and Pavlovian learning 
theory by focusing on the mental processes which intervene between stimulus and 
response.  For example, Mahoney explored the role of cognitive processes such as 
expectation and attribution in conditioning (Mahoney and Arnkoff, 1978).  Various 
cognitive-behavioural therapies were developed in response to this shift in emphasis 
on the role of cognitive processes.  One example is Ellis‟s rational emotive therapy 
(Ellis, 1962), now known as rational emotive behaviour therapy (REBT), in which 
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emotional disturbance is argued to derive from underlying evaluative „irrational‟ 
beliefs.  Ellis‟ theory was based on the philosophical branch of Stoicism in which it 
was proposed that peace of mind comes from acceptance of realism.  Within REBT it 
is philosophical change which is aimed for, through the targeting of these underlying 
irrational beliefs.  Similarities with Beck‟s cognitive therapy are apparent.  However, 
rather than deriving from a philosophical stance, Beck developed his model from 
research he carried out into depression. This, and subsequent research, established 
the presence of negative cognitive content during depressive episodes, leading 
cognitive researchers to assume a causal role for cognition in depression (Clark et al., 
1999).  Furthermore, according to this cognitive theory, individuals who hold 
negative self-schemas (i.e. negative beliefs about the self, the world and the future) 
when otherwise well, are more likely to develop depression in the future (Beck, 
1967).  Beck‟s cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT), as it is now known, involves 
addressing this „thought disorder‟ through processes of distancing, reframing and de-
centring (Beck, 2005).  This entails identifying problematic cognitions (also known 
as negative thoughts), weighing up evidence to evaluate the validity of their content 
(distancing), altering these thoughts to make them more „reality-based‟ (reframing, 
which is also known as cognitive restructuring) and thus de-emphasising meanings of 
the thoughts and reorienting patterns of thinking (de-centring).  It should be noted, 
however, that although similarities between REBT and CBT are apparent, 
proponents of REBT would argue that a fundamental difference lies in REBT‟s aim 
not to try to change the actual inferences that individual‟s make, but try to change the 
process by which they evaluate these inferences.  In other words, cognitive 
restructuring or reframing is not used but de-centring is still a therapeutic goal. 
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1.1.5.2 Metacognitive Therapy (MCT) 
A more recent development within the cognitive branch is metacognitive therapy 
(MCT; Wells, 1995).   Similar to REBT, it is this contrast between the principle 
focus on mental processes as opposed to mental content which underscores MCT.  
Within MCT it is proposed that emotional disorder is caused by the way thinking 
processes are controlled and the style they take, such as worry and rumination.  
Wells (2008) goes on to highlight the difference with traditional CBT: „Content is 
important in MCT, but it is the content of metacognition rather than the content of 
cognition that counts.‟(p.651).  „Metacognition‟ refers to the stored content of beliefs 
about cognition, to cognitive processes in terms of evaluations of (and attributions 
about) processes and mental phenomenon, and also to implicit rules of what to do in 
response to certain cognitive events. 
MCT derives from the Self-Regulatory Executive Function Model (S-REF: Wells & 
Matthews, 1994) in which it proposes that a thinking style known as the Cognitive 
Attentional System (CAS) is a universal feature of disorder and is responsible for 
prolonging and intensifying distressing emotions.  This consists of repetitive thinking 
in the form of worry and rumination, which is used as a means of coping with threat.  
It also consists of an attentional strategy in which sources of threat (which are often 
internal e.g. thoughts and feelings) are focussed on excessively.  Also implicated are 
unhelpful coping behaviours, such as avoidance, which prevent the testing out of 
faulty beliefs.  Within the S-REF model, the CAS is the result of metacognitive 
beliefs which control thinking processes.  An example of such metacognition would 
be positive beliefs about the process of rumination, such as “ruminating about my 
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depression helps me to understand past mistakes and failures”.  A more detailed 
summary of the S-REF model and its account of rumination is provided in section 
1.2.5.5. 
In terms of therapeutic techniques, MCT incorporates attention training designed to 
reduce perseveration (i.e. worry or rumination), increase flexibility in the control of 
attention and thinking processes, and promote metacognitive awareness.  However, 
because it was found that this procedure was not sufficient in reducing rumination 
additional techniques were included specifically for the treatment of depression 
(Papageorgiou & Wells, 2000).  These techniques were intended to increase 
adherence with attention training and focussed on directly modifying erroneous 
metacognitive beliefs which, according to the S-REF model, drive the ruminative 
response.  This process of modifying underlying metacognitive beliefs is carried out 
by training patients first to identify their own rumination and threat monitoring, then 
challenge any negative metacognitive beliefs they hold about the uncontrollability 
and significance of depressive thoughts and feelings, and challenge any positive 
metacognitive beliefs they hold about the utility of ruminating and engaging in threat 
monitoring as a means of coping (Wells et al., 2009).   Again this therapeutic 
technique is similar to the distancing and reframing techniques of traditional CBT, 
although the focus is on the identification and reframing of metacognitions rather 
than cognitions.  Within this model, it is believed that by updating the metacognitive 
content that controls and directs automatic processes, it will lead to less of such 
processes (such as thought intrusion and rumination).  The role of metacognition in 
relation to rumination and depression is explored more fully in section 1.3. 
23 
 
1.1.5.3 Acceptance and mindfulness based therapies 
Acceptance and mindfulness branches of psychological therapy, sometimes known 
as „third wave‟ therapies (Hayes, 2004), have argued that the traditional clinical 
cognitive model is flawed.  In particular, the cognitive primacy theory which states 
that cognitions need to be challenged and reframed in order for change to occur has 
been criticised.  For example, Longmore & Worrell (2007) suggest that the 
hypothesis is not well accounted for, and cognitions change when a person recovers 
from their mood disorder regardless of whether the treatment method used directly 
addresses cognitions (e.g. Rehm et al., 1987; Imber et al., 1990).  This finding has 
been extended to schemata which are noted to disappear upon mood recovery and are 
therefore not stable underlying vulnerability traits, as the „schema vulnerability 
hypothesis‟ would suggest, but are mood activated (Teasdale, 1988).  Indeed, 
longitudinal research has not established negative cognitive biases as independent 
predictors of depression (Ingram et al., 1998).  Segal and colleagues (1999) found 
that what predicted depressive relapse was not a person‟s degree of belief in 
dysfunctional thoughts, but how easily small changes in their mood triggered these 
attitudes.   Acceptance and mindfulness based therapies have suggested that the 
clinical change reported by traditional cognitive-behavioural outcome studies are 
actually due to the changes people make in their relationship to their thoughts, rather 
than to changes made to the content of them.  Within a clinical context, it has 
therefore been suggested that an emphasis on „decentring‟ techniques rather than 
„reframing‟ techniques is particularly relevant for problems in which rumination is a 
factor (Teasdale et al., 2003).  It is noted that this emphasis on decentring is similar 
to the stance of REBT but that whereas identification and challenging of „irrational‟ 
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beliefs and inferences is key in REBT (again, a form of „reframing‟ as used by 
MCT), acceptance and mindfulness-based approaches argue that this approach is not 
only unnecessary but may be counter-productive because of the risk that it may 
exacerbate cognitive entanglement (Hayes, 2002) or that the task of identifying 
negative cognitions may provide further material for ruminative tendencies (Haeffel, 
2010).  Although these are common claims amongst proponents of acceptance-based 
approaches, they must be treated with caution.  There is indeed preliminary evidence 
that when using traditional cognitive skills self-help training (in the form of 
workbooks), the component of identifying and evaluating negative cognitions 
appears to be associated with greater levels of depressive symptoms post-
intervention, in a sample of students: particularly in those who ruminate (Haeffel, 
2010).  However, no similar studies have been conducted which explore this 
phenomenon in participants experiencing clinically significant levels of depression, 
or in the use of therapist-provided cognitive therapy.  Furthermore, various studies 
have shown that the use of cognitive therapy alone to treat depression can reduce 
rates of recurrence to 20-36% over at least one year follow-up (Blackburn et al., 
1986; Simons et al., 1986; Evans et al., 1992). 
One particular mindfulness-based therapy is Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy 
(MBCT; Segal et al., 2002) which was developed specifically in response to the 
modest initial response rate and high levels of relapse found in patients who received 
CBT for depression.  MBCT focuses on specific cognitive processes associated with 
depression, including ruminative tendencies.  Individuals are taught to develop a 
decentred awareness of their ruminative state of mind without engaging in the 
thoughts themselves, with the intention of replacing rumination with a non-
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ruminative self-focus.  There is some evidence that mindfulness-based interventions 
reduce rumination (Jain et al., 2007; Ramel et al., 2004; Shapiro et al., 2007) and 
Shapiro and colleagues (2007) have found that an increase in mindfulness during 
intervention predicts a drop in rumination.  Furthermore, Jain and colleagues (2007) 
reported that the effects of a mindfulness intervention on reducing distress were 
partially mediated by reducing rumination.  The relationship between rumination and 
depression is discussed in more detail in section 1.2.3. 
 
1.1.5.4 Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) 
Also within this category of acceptance and mindfulness based therapies is 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT: Hayes et al., 1999).  ACT describes 
itself as a third-wave behavioural therapy, however it differs in its approach to the 
understanding of psychopathology, including depression, from traditional 
behavioural approaches.  From an ACT perspective, psychopathology can result 
from or be exacerbated by psychological inflexibility (Hayes et al., 1999).  
Psychological inflexibility refers to the inability to adapt or modify behaviour 
(including verbal behaviour) in response to how (un)helpful it is.  Within an ACT 
treatment model, six factors are implicated in contributing to psychological 
inflexibility.  These are cognitive fusion, experiential avoidance, attachment to a 
conceptualised self, lack of contact with the present moment, lack of clarity of life 
values, and inaction towards these values (Hayes et al., 2006). 
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Historically, within a behavioural approach, emphasis would largely be placed on 
overt behaviour rather than the core emotional experience, even when accounting for 
the processes of depression (Kanter et al., 2008).  Although Skinner did describe the 
experience of depression as an “emotional condition” (Skinner, 1953, p.165) he 
emphasised what he saw as the core issue of reduced positive reinforcement in 
depression which led to reduced social behaviour.  However, the limitations of this 
model in accounting for the variety and complexity of factors initiating and 
maintaining depression are apparent.  ACT does not place such limited emphasis on 
the role of the emotional experience in depression.  Indeed, ACT suggests that 
experiential avoidance, in which attempts are made to avoid or control one‟s internal 
experiences, is implicated in most forms of psychopathology (Hayes et al., 1996).  In 
support of this, a recent meta-analysis by Aldao and colleagues (2010) found that 
avoidance had a medium size relationship with psychopathology.  In the case of 
depression it is argued that individuals not only avoid the external situations which 
occasion depression but also avoid feeling the depression itself (e.g. sadness, fatigue, 
self-critical thoughts, pessimistic predictions, etc).  In this respect, similarities exist 
with Martell, Addis and Jacobson‟s (2001) theory behind behavioural activation.  
Both theories argue that problematic avoidance in depression is not always a 
response to the environment per se, but is a response to the core aversive experience 
of depression (which is in turn considered to be a response to the environment).  
Furthermore, both models suggest that, once elicited, the core affective experience of 
depression may play a functional role in maintaining, exacerbating and creating the 
additional symptoms of depression.  Specifically, it may evoke behaviour designed to 
avoid and escape the private response which is itself negatively reinforced by a 
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reduction in aversive emotional experience (Barlow, 2002).  Indeed, such a 
functional relationship between avoidance and depression has received some 
empirical support (Ottenbreit & Dobson, 2004).    
ACT further diverges from more traditional behavioural models in that it also offers 
additional theoretical elaborations that suggest a more prominent role for verbal 
behaviour.  For example, ACT suggests that experiential avoidance repertoires are 
maintained over long periods of time because they are „rule governed‟ or verbally 
controlled (Hayes & Ju, 1998).   For example, it is proposed that rumination is 
associated with reason-giving i.e. individuals ruminate in order to solve and get rid of 
their depression by arriving at the reasons or causes for it (Zettle & Hayes, 2002).  
ACT is based upon a theory of language and cognition called Relational Frame 
Theory (RFT; Hayes et al., 2001).  According to RFT, verbal behaviour, which 
includes thinking, is technically seen as the behaviour of framing events relationally.  
It is proposed that verbal behaviour, such as rumination, can magnify and extend 
normal adaptive experiences of elicited affect, such as a sad mood, into disordered 
experiences.  A more detailed description of the RFT model and its account of 
rumination is provided in section 1.2.5.6. 
In cognitive therapy for depression much emphasis is placed upon challenging 
distorted cognitive content and shaping the adoption of more balanced reasoning.  
Many strategies are developed for this purpose and it is considered a primary task of 
therapy (Beck et al., 1979).  However, within ACT the focus is not on directly 
modifying such psychological events but on changing the function of these events 
and the individual‟s relationship to them (Hayes et al., 2006).  However the 
28 
 
techniques used to do so differ from those used in MBCT.  Within ACT, therapeutic 
techniques are incorporated specifically to address the further overlapping issues 
which are suggested to promote psychological inflexibility.  For example, it is 
proposed within ACT that cognitive fusion plays an integral role in maintaining 
psychological distress, such as that associated with depression.  Cognitive fusion is 
defined in various ways within the ACT literature.  One definition is that it is the 
inability to detect the ongoing process of thinking as distinct from the products of 
thinking (Fletcher & Hayes, 2005) i.e. during periods of cognitive fusion people may 
equate thoughts with reality, or as „truths about the self‟, rather than simply as 
commentaries on life events and experiences.  Within an ACT treatment for 
depression, techniques are deployed to encourage cognitive defusion i.e. to take a 
metaphorical „step back‟ from thoughts and recognise them as transient words, 
sounds and pictures, without getting caught up in them, thus reducing their impact 
and influence on other behaviours.  This is similar to the intention of mindfulness 
techniques in which decentring is advocated without engaging in any reframing 
processes.  However, clear differences between the concepts of cognitive defusion 
and mindfulness can be drawn.   
Mindfulness is generally defined as a type of non-judgemental and accepting focus in 
which attention is brought to internal and external stimuli as they arise, without 
evaluating them (e.g. Baer et al., 2006).   It is acknowledged that mindfulness is 
related to several procedures described within ACT, including cognitive defusion 
(Hayes & Wilson, 2003).  However, mindfulness is a broader concept than simply 
focusing on thoughts and the reduction of entanglement with language: it also 
incorporates acceptance and exposure processes.  Again, both of these processes are 
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also promoted within ACT interventions, though by different means than those 
employed by Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy.  It therefore seems that 
mindfulness is a concept which, although it may promote cognitive defusion, also 
encapsulates several other processes.  The two concepts are not interchangeable. 
In addition to defusion techniques, ACT employs further interacting techniques, 
including exercises aimed to encourage acceptance of internal experiences even if 
they are unpleasant (i.e. reduce experiential avoidance), increase contact with the 
present moment (again akin to mindfulness), bring attention to the „observing self‟ 
(i.e. encouraging a process of distancing, in which private events such as thoughts 
are observed rather than engaged with, and „the self‟ is experienced as distinct from 
private events), clarifying personal values, and fostering willingness or „committed 
action‟ in acting in ways which move in the direction of goals which have been 
guided by these personal values (Harris, 2006; Zettle & Hayes, 2002). 
It is of note that the techniques described thus far are those employed in any ACT 
treatment.  However, within specifically depression-focussed ACT treatments, 
particular attention is paid to the processes of cognitive fusion, evaluation and self-
discrimination, avoidance, and reason giving (Zettle, 2007).  It has been proposed 
that these factors each have a role in the maintenance of ruminative cognitive 
processes and will be discussed further within the context of RFT.  In addition, the 
specific role of cognitive fusion in relation to rumination and depression is explored 




1.1.5.5.Overlapping themes within MCT and ACT 
Although there are major conceptual differences between MCT and ACT, some 
overlapping themes are apparent.  For example, both MCT and ACT share a focus on 
reducing judgement and evaluation of personal experience, although there are major 
differences in the way this is conceptualised and implemented.  MCT states that its 
goal is not acceptance or greater awareness of the present moment, but strengthening 
of executive control (Wells et al., 2009).  Although both MCT and ACT reject 
conventional CBT techniques such as disputing automatic thoughts, MCT does 
incorporate verbal techniques such as verbal challenging of the advantages of 
rumination.  Such „reframing‟ techniques are not included in ACT.  However, within 
both MCT and ACT a prominent role is given to cognitions, or verbal behaviour, in 
the maintenance of psychological disorders.  Verbal thought processes such as 
rumination are implicated in the maintenance of depression from the perspective of 
both treatment models, although they differ in their conceptualisation of the drivers 
for such thought processes and the means by which they maintain depression 
symptoms.  In research exploring vulnerability factors for depression, specific 
cognitive processes or thinking styles have indeed been found to be associated with 
both the onset and maintenance of depression: in particular, a ruminative cognitive 








1.2.1 Definition of rumination 
It is evident from the literature in the area of rumination that differences in the 
definition, assessment and conceptualisation of rumination abound (e.g. Smith & 
Alloy, 2009).  However, it is broadly agreed that rumination is a type of repetitive 
thinking and a form of analytical and problem directed self-focus.  As such it can be 
defined as persistent, recursive, self-focussed attention.  Within much of the research 
on depressive rumination, the response styles theory (RST; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991) 
conceptualisation is the most widely cited and it is this definition which will be 
adopted in this study.  According to RST rumination is defined in the following way: 
Rumination is a mode of responding to distress that involves repetitively 
and passively focusing on symptoms of distress and on the possible 
causes and consequences of these symptoms. (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 
2008, p.400) 
 
1.2.2 Rumination versus worry 
Another form of repetitive thinking is worry.  However, it has been argued that there 
are major conceptual differences between worry and rumination.  For example, some 
studies have indicated specificity of rumination to depression and worry to anxiety 
32 
 
(Fresco et al., 2002; McLaughlin et al., 2007).  When directly comparing measures 
of worry and rumination, researchers have found that they load on different factors 
and are statistically distinguishable (Fresco et al., 2002; Watkins et al., 2005).  There 
are also distinguishing features noted in both the processes and in the content of 
worry and rumination.  In comparison with worry, rumination is associated with less 
effort and less confidence in problem-solving (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2004).  It has 
also been demonstrated that worry thoughts are often future-orientated and focus on 
anticipated threats, whereas ruminative thoughts tend to be more past-/present-
oriented and focus on issues of self-worth, meaning and themes of loss (Beck et al., 
1987; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008; Papageorgiou & Wells, 1999).  However, 
although the content of ruminative thought may contain negative themes, Nolen-
Hoeksema (2004) contends that rumination as a cognitive style is distinct from the 
concept of negative automatic thoughts proposed by Beck‟s (1979) cognitive theory.  
Rumination is defined primarily by its style rather than its specific content. 
 
1.2.3 The relationship between rumination and depression 
Research into the relationship between affect and cognition has highlighted an 
association between depression and a particular ruminative cognitive style.  Indeed 
rumination appears to have a unique relationship to depression and continues to be 
related to depression after statistically controlling for several other negative cognitive 
styles such as neuroticism, pessimism and perfectionism (e.g. Flett et al., 2002; 
Spasojevic & Alloy, 2001) and after controlling for other general emotional 
problems (McIntosh, Gillanders & Rodgers, 2010).  Research into the role of 
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rumination has been championed by Susan Nolen-Hoeksema who initially explored 
the role of rumination in accounting for gender differences in depression rates.  
Several studies have found that there are gender differences in levels of rumination, 
with women more likely to ruminate than men (Butler & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1994; 
Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1999; Roberts et al., 1998).  Indeed, in some studies, gender 
difference in rumination has been found to mediate the gender difference in 
depression (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1999; Roberts et al., 1998). 
In general, a ruminative cognitive style has been identified as a risk factor for the 
onset of depression.  For example, the presence of rumination has been found to 
predict the onset of depression in non-depressed individuals (e.g. Just & Alloy, 
1997). In one longitudinal study, a group of students were assessed by chance on a 
measure of rumination and a measure of depression severity just two weeks before a 
major earthquake (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991).  Measures were completed 
again at intervals of ten days and seven weeks after the event.  A regression analysis 
was conducted and it was found that people who reported before the event a 
tendency to respond to low mood by ruminating had the highest depression scores 
following the event, even after controlling for the degree of trauma exposure and loss 
experienced due to the earthquake.  In addition to studies of non-clinical dysphoria, 
studies regarding clinical levels of depression have also shown that higher levels of 
rumination represent a vulnerability factor to depression.  In a large scale prospective 
study using a random sample of about 1,300 community participants, it was found 
that rumination scores at first assessment predicted new onsets of major depressive 
disorder over the next year (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000).  Significantly, it has also been 
found that patients who have remitted from depression demonstrate elevated 
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rumination scores compared to never-depressed controls (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; 
McIntosh et al., 2010) and rumination within this population also predicts future 
episodes of depression (Huffziger & Kuehner, 2009).  For this reason it has been 
proposed that not only is rumination a core cognitive process in depression, it also 
represents a cognitive vulnerability to relapse and recurrence (Nolen-Hoeksema et 
al., 2008; Teasdale et al.,1995).  
A link between the presence of a ruminative cognitive style and more prolonged 
periods of depression has been reported in a variety of prospective longitudinal 
studies looking at non-clinical participants (Just & Alloy, 1997; Kuehner & Weber, 
1999; Nolan et al., 1998; Spasojevic & Alloy, 2001).  However, with participants 
experiencing major depressive disorder, findings regarding the role of rumination in 
predicting duration of episodes are more equivocal, with some studies finding that a 
ruminative cognitive style predicts the maintenance of depressive symptoms in 
depressed individuals (e.g. Umberson et al., 1992) and others finding that it does not 
(e.g. Arrow et al., 2004; Bagby & Parker, 2001; Kuehner & Weber, 1999; Park et al., 
2004; Raes et al., 2006).  The suggestion that rumination should predict the duration 
of depressive moods has therefore been challenged.  
It has also been suggested that variation in levels of rumination can predict the 
severity of the depression experienced (Hong, 2007; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2007; 
Sarin et al., 2005).  For example, in Nolen-Hoeksema‟s (2000) prospective study, it 
was found that rumination at the first point of measurement predicted depression 
severity a year later in both adults who were already experiencing clinical depression 
and in adults who were not.  Furthermore, in several experimental studies using 
35 
 
rumination manipulations, it has been found that rumination induction significantly 
increases dysphoric mood in dysphoric participants but has no effect on mood in 
non-dysphoric participants (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993, 1995; Morrow 
& Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990).  This has led to the suggestion that rumination is 
depressogenic (Nolen-Hoeksema et al.,1994).  Similar laboratory experiments using 
clinically depressed participants have found similar effects (Donaldson & Lam, 
2004; Lavender & Watkins, 2004; Watkins & Moulds, 2005), although in other 
laboratory based experimental studies it has been found that induced rumination 
maintains rather than exacerbates negative affect in clinically depressed participants 
(Huffziger & Kuehner, 2009; Singer & Dobson, 2007).   However, caution must be 
given in interpreting these findings as there can be problems with observational 
methods of studying emotion regulation.  For example, it has been found that some 
participants have great difficulty in using specific strategies, such as adopting a 
ruminative cognitive style, as instructed under experimental conditions (Demaree et 
al., 2006).  Yet, it is noted that all of the experimental studies cited controlled for 
concurrent depression levels, suggesting that a ruminative response style does not 
merely reflect a cognitive epiphenomenon of depression, and thus further confirming 
the significance of rumination as cognitive vulnerability factor for depression.   
In summary, higher levels of rumination have been found in people who are 
depressed and people who have recovered from depression.  Furthermore, rumination 
has consistently been found to predict the onset and severity of depression in both 
clinical and non-clinical samples, suggesting that rumination represents not only a 
cognitive vulnerability to depression but is an exacerbating factor of depression 
symptoms.  However, findings for the relationship between rumination and duration 
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of the depressed episode are more mixed in clinical samples, even though rumination 
does seem to predict duration of depressed mood in non-clinical samples.  Nolen-
Hoeksema and colleagues (2008) hypothesise that rumination may contribute 
towards an individual moving from across a metaphorical „threshold‟ going from 
experiencing general low mood into a major depressive episode, but that once they 
are in an episode of depression, other autonomous, self-perpetuating processes are 
engaged which maintain and determine the duration of episodes. Furthermore, it has 
been found that rumination is associated with a variety of cognitive correlates and 
maladaptive behaviours which could also maintain depression.   
 
1.2.4 Cognitive and behavioural correlates of rumination 
It has been found that rumination is associated with poor problem solving beyond 
what deficits could be accounted for by depressive symptoms (Lyubomirsky & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Donaldson & Lam, 2004; Watkins & Moulds, 2005).  In 
their experimental study, Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema (1995) randomly 
assigned dysphoric and non-dysphoric individuals to an induced rumination 
condition or an induced distraction condition, and compared performance on a 
problem-solving task.  It was found that performance was significantly reduced in 
those who were dysphoric and had been induced to ruminate, compared to the other 
three groups.  In a similarly designed study in which a clinically depressed group and 
non-depressed control group were compared, it was found that both naturally-
occurring rumination and induced rumination in those with depression significantly 
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predicted less effective problem-solving performance.  Similar differences have also 
been found in individuals who have recovered from depression (Watkins & Baracaia, 
2002).  
Other cognitive correlates have also been identified.  For example, studies have 
shown that individuals who ruminate perform more poorly on tests of cognitive 
flexibility, such as the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, which measures set-shifting 
ability (e.g. Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000).  It is also reported that rumination 
may be associated with biases in information processing, specifically in a tendency to 
selectively attend to and recall negative information rather than positive information.  
For example, negative biases have been found in both the retrieval of 
autobiographical memories and the generation of predictions about the future, when 
depressed people have been induced to ruminate (Lyubomirsky et al., 1999).  
Furthermore, even when controlling for depressive symptoms, self-reported 
rumination predicts negative bias on an attention measure (Donaldson et al., 2007).  
Additionally, rumination is also significantly correlated with over-general 
autobiographical memory (Watkins et al., 2000), biased judgment and perception of 
others‟ facial expressions (Raes et al., 2006), pessimistic outlook (Nolen-Hoeksema 
et al., 1994) and impaired motivation and inhibition of instrumental behaviour 
(Lyubomirsky et al., 1995; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993).  
Further cognitive and behavioural correlates of rumination are reported to be 
impaired concentration (Lyubomirsky & Tkach, 2004) and decreased willingness to 
engage in pleasant or distracting activities (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993).  
A recent study also found in a non-clinical sample that higher levels of rumination 
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was associated with significantly higher levels of self-reported experiential 
avoidance and greater fear of emotions (Giorgio et al., 2010).  Indeed, rumination 
has also been associated with behaviours such as alcohol abuse (Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Harrell, 2002) and self-injurious behaviour (Miranda & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2007), 
both of which can be categorised as experiential avoidance behaviours.  However, it 
is noted that the research cited has not disentangled the direction of relationships 
between rumination, depression and other variables, so conclusions about causation 
of other cognitive and behavioural correlates of depression cannot be made.   
Nevertheless, various mechanisms have been proposed to account for the effects of 
ruminative responses on the maintenance of depressive mood (Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1987).  As previously described, rumination interferes with attentional mechanisms 
which in turn interfere with the initiation of instrumental behaviours.  It has been 
proposed that a ruminative response style maintains depressed mood because it 
reduces attention to other more adaptive problem-solving behaviours (e.g. Kuhl, 
1981).  It has also been suggested that the increased accessibility towards negative 
information stored in autobiographical memory when a depressed mood has been 
induced may also account for the relationship between rumination and depression 
(e.g. Bower, 1981).  It has been found that overgeneral memories become more 
thematic of negative episodes therefore biasing judgement more than specific 
memories do (Watkins & Teasdale, 2001).  Furthermore, it is suggested that a 
ruminative response style has an effect on the type of explanation individuals provide 
for their mood state, ergo whilst experiencing a depressed mood, people who adopt a 
ruminative response style will favour self-deprecating explanations for their mood 
which, in turn, reinforces the depressive state (e.g. Abramson et al., 1978).  Other 
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explanations have focused on the role of behavioural avoidance within the 
relationship between rumination and depression.  For example, Moulds and 
colleagues (2007) examined relationships between rumination, behavioural 
avoidance and depression in a non-clinical sample.  They found that cognitive and 
behavioural avoidance predicted unique variance in depression scores, over and 
above anxiety and rumination.  
These differing explanations for the mechanisms by which rumination interacts with 
depression and other cognitive and behavioural processes have led to the 
development of various models of rumination, some of which will be explored in 
more detail. 
 
1.2.5  Models of rumination 
It is noted that there is potential for overlap among many of the models of 
rumination.  However, the models are underpinned by distinct theories.  Models of 
rumination as a response style (RST; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991), a stress reaction 
(Alloy et al., 2000), a function of goal progress (Martin et al., 2004), and a 
conceptual-evaluative self-focus (Watkins, 2004a, 2004b) have been proposed.  
These will be described briefly in order to illustrate why they have not been included 
as the focus of this study (although a full review and critique of each is beyond the 
scope of this thesis).  However, two particular models will be explored in more detail 
as they form the theoretical underpinning for the cognitive processes which are the 
particular focus of this study.  These models define rumination as a form of self-
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regulation governed by metacognition (S-REF; Wells & Matthews, 1994), and as a 
product of verbal sense-making and cognitive fusion (RFT; Hayes et al., 2001). 
 
1.2.5.1  Response Styles Theory (RST; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991) 
The Response Styles Theory (RST) is a cognitive vulnerability theory for the onset, 
exacerbation and maintenance of depressive episodes.  The theory arose from 
empirical attempts to explain gender differences in depression and it was suggested 
that the way in which people respond to their mood is the key issue.  Within RST, it 
is proposed that two different coping styles (rumination and distraction) can be 
initiated in response to depressed moods and symptoms.  A ruminative coping style, 
which is characterised as maladaptive, comprises of individuals passively focusing 
attention upon their experience of dysphoric symptoms and on their possible causes 
and consequences.  A distractive coping style, which is characterised as adaptive, is 
defined as actively turning one‟s attention away from the depressive symptoms onto 
pleasant or neutral thoughts and actions.  However, it is behavioural activation in 
response to depressed mood, rather than distraction of attention that appears key.  
This theory presumes that rumination and distraction are purposeful trait-like styles 
of responding to, or trying to cope with, negative mood (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991) and 
are activated in response to negative affect.  However, it is of note that the distraction 
component of RST has received mixed support (Butler & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1994; 
Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) and much of the research in this field has 
focussed purely upon the role of rumination in depression. 
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According to RST, rumination is a dysfunctional mode of self-focussed attention 
which activates and interacts with other cognitive and behavioural factors to promote 
and maintain depression.  It is suggested that rumination activates negative 
associative memory networks and increases negative thought content which, in turn, 
interferes with attention, inhibits effective problem solving and other instrumental 
skills behaviour, and, as a result, disrupts adaptive engagement with social support 
networks.  It is through such processes that rumination is suggested to maintain or 
exacerbate depressive states, as well as represent a cognitive vulnerability factor for 
future depressive episodes (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2004; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008).   
 
1.2.5.2  Stress-Reactive Rumination Model (Alloy et al., 2000) 
Within the stress-reactive rumination model it is suggested that rumination is based 
on negative inferences associated with stressful life events.  This model is rooted in 
the literature regarding post-event processing which links stressful events and later 
ruminative thinking.  Within the stress-reactive model it is suggested that rumination 
is an attempt to process information related to a stressful interpersonal interaction or 
traumatic event.  The parallels with theory regarding the prevalence of intrusive 
thoughts in Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder are apparent, and the role of intrusive 
memories in depression has been the focus of increasing research interest over recent 
years with treatment techniques such as imagery rescripting being employed (e.g. 
Wheatley et al., 2007).  However, a potential limitation of this model is that it is 
restricted to accounting for the presence of thoughts related to stressful events rather 
than more general negative evaluative self-focus. 
42 
 
1.2.5.3  Goal Progress Theory (Martin et al., 2004) 
Within goal progress theory it is suggested that rumination is a self-regulatory 
process which occurs when there is goal discrepancy i.e. when an individual 
perceives that they are not adequately progressing towards a specific, individually 
valued goal.  It is suggested that information regarding incomplete goals is likely to 
remain on an individual‟s mind, perhaps in the form of rumination.  Martin and 
colleagues (2004) argue that support for this theory lies in the finding that people 
more readily recall information about incomplete tasks rather than completed tasks.  
They suggest that rumination keeps information related to the goal in memory longer 
and although it may not ultimately aid goal progress, this is the intended function.  It 
would therefore appear that within goal progress theory rumination is an intentional 
strategy adopted in order to aid goal attainment. 
 
1.2.5.4  Conceptual-Evaluative Self-Focus (Watkins, 2004a, 2004b) 
Based upon Teasdale and Barnard‟s (1993) multi-level conceptual framework known 
as Interacting Cognitive Subsystems (ICS), it is suggested that self-focus can occur 
in one of two forms.  Conceptual-evaluative self-focus is analytical, evaluative 
thinking about the self which focuses on discrepancies between current and desired 
outcomes.   In contrast, experiential self-focus is an adaptive form of self-focus 
which is described as non-evaluative, intuitive and in the moment awareness of 
experience.  It is suggested that the content of thought is not necessarily different 
across the two styles but that the individual‟s relationship with their thoughts differs, 
43 
 
i.e. it is the contextual factor of the thinking style which is of crucial importance in 
determining whether the self-focus will have a negative impact.  Within the ICS 
framework it is proposed that an individual can only focus consciously on 
information within one mode at any moment in time.  From an ICS perspective, self-
focussed processing of emotional material is adaptive and facilitates processing in 
the experiential mode, but is maladaptive and prevents effective emotional 
processing in the conceptual mode.  It is suggested that rumination is a „depressive 
interlock‟ which occurs within the conceptual mode and, at times of lowering mood, 
habitual patterns of cognitive processing switch in relatively automatically and this 
thinking intensifies depressed mood which, in turn, leads to further thoughts.    
According to ICS, learning to become aware of one‟s „mode of mind‟ and disengage 
from it can facilitate movement from a conceptual to an experiential mode, thus 
interrupting this depressive interlock. 
 
1.2.5.5  Self-Regulatory Executive Function Model (S-REF; Wells & Matthews, 
1994, 1996) 
Wells and Matthews‟ (1994) S-REF model is an integrative information processing 
model of emotional disorder.  It proposes that dysfunctional processing is associated 
with emotional disorder.   Generally, Wells and Matthews (1994) suggest that within 
emotion-related processing operations, different configurations of processing can be 
identified within an „architecture‟ of three interacting cognitive levels.  These three 
levels comprise of a level of automatic and reflexively driven processing, a level of 
attentionally demanding, voluntary (i.e. controlled) processing, and a level of stored 
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knowledge or self-beliefs (Wells & Matthews, 1996).  It is proposed that the 
configuration most relevant in emotional disorder involves the latter two levels: 
controlled processing and self-beliefs.  In other words, the configuration most 
relevant in emotional disorder consists of self-regulatory processing driven by self-
beliefs.  It is this configuration which is known as self-regulatory executive function 
(S-REF).  Within the S-REF model, processing performs appraisal of external events 
and physical reactions, and appraisal of the significance of thoughts (i.e. 
metacognition) which, in turn, guides subsequent cognitions.  It is suggested that 
because this process takes place in the controlled processing level, which is of 
limited capacity, it is sensitive to attentional resource demands.  Furthermore, 
operations carried out within the controlled processing level are guided by self-
knowledge or self-beliefs.  These beliefs include declarative beliefs or procedural 
beliefs.  Procedural beliefs are proposed to direct the activities of the controlled 
processing system i.e. they direct self-attention, memory retrieval, appraisal and 
meta-cognitive processing in response to stimuli.  One particular set of activities 
within the controlled processing system is said to contribute to emotional disorder 
and relapse following treatment.  This set of activities is known as the cognitive-
attentional syndrome (CAS) and consists of heightened self-focused attention, 
reduced efficiency of cognitive functioning, activation of self-beliefs and self-
appraisal, attentional bias and capacity limitations (Wells & Matthews, 1996). 
One particular component of the CAS is perseverative negative thinking in the form 
of worry or rumination.  This is viewed as a coping strategy that is counterproductive 
in that it ultimately perpetuates emotional disorder.  It is suggested that this is due to 
three factors: 1. Ruminating depletes resources within the limited capacity controlled 
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processing level, thus reducing the resource available needed for execution of plans 
which would disconfirm dysfunctional beliefs; 2. Ruminating continuously primes 
dysfunctional self-beliefs thus reducing the threshold for intrusion of congruent 
information into consciousness i.e. attention becomes more valenced; 3. Active 
rumination of a verbal-conceptual nature is suggested to impede emotion processing. 
According to the S-REF model, repetitive thoughts are generated by attempts to cope 
with discrepancies between perceptions of a current state and a goal.  Furthermore, it 
is suggested that within the CAS, an individual‟s selection and engagement in 
cognitive processing styles such as rumination or worry is supported and directed by 
underlying metacognitive beliefs concerning the function and consequence of these 
processing styles.  More simply, rumination is a misguided emotion regulation 
strategy that individuals engage in because they believe it will help them solve 
problems.  An example of such metacognition would be “ruminating about my 
depression helps me to understand past mistakes and failures”.  This metacognitive 
model has been proposed as a basis for understanding the persistence and recurrence 
of depression (Wells et al., 2009). 
In summary, within the S-REF model, vulnerability to depression can be traced to the 
ease with which an individual activates the CAS in response to lowered affect.  This, 
in turn, is linked to individual differences in metacognitive beliefs and the degree of 
flexible executive control over processing (Wells et al., 2009).  It would therefore 
seem that the S-REF model emphasises the intentional nature of adopting rumination 
as a cognitive style.  Furthermore, although not focusing specifically on the content 
of the ruminative thoughts themselves, emphasis is placed upon the pivotal nature of 
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the content of thoughts about the ruminative thoughts i.e. on the content of 
metacognitions.  The S-REF model proposes that it is these metacognitive beliefs 
which drive rumination and this has led to the development of a clinical 
metacognitive model of rumination and depression (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003, 
2004).  This will be explored further in section 1.3. 
 
1.2.5.6  Relational Frame Theory (RFT; Hayes et al., 2001) 
RFT is the theoretical framework which underpins Acceptance and Commitment 
Therapy (ACT).  It has its roots in the philosophy of functional contextualism, a 
particular philosophy of science.  Essentially, this philosophy maintains that 
behaviour can only be fully understood within its current and historical context and 
that in order to fully understand a behaviour, its function within its particular context 
must be understood.  For example, it is argued that analysing the problem 
behaviours, or behavioural symptoms, of a patient without considering the contexts 
that participate in the event will miss the nature of the problem and, furthermore, 
miss potential solutions (Hayes, 2004).  In addition to the perspective of the 
importance of understanding a person‟s behaviour in relation to its function in 
context, functional contextualism also applies this same argument to the behaviour of 
the scientist and the behaviour of the clinician.  In this manner, the analyses of the 
behaviour that are provided by either the clinician or scientist are not thought to be 
„true‟ in the traditionally understood sense that scientists „uncover‟ the truth of the 
universe.  „Truth‟ from a functional contextual perspective is determined only by the 
pragmatic utility of the analysis, in relation to a specified goal.  It is proposed that an 
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understanding of the functional properties of a behaviour, rather than simply its 
topography, is required in order to understand the pragmatic „truth‟ of these 
behaviours and, in doing so, specific scientific goals can be set against which to 
apply this „truth‟ criterion, allowing for the prediction and influence of said 
behaviour. 
 Within RFT, it is suggested that the contextual factors within which behaviours 
occur are also social-verbal in nature.   Emphasis is placed on the role of language in 
understanding behaviour, as it is proposed that events acquire their psychological 
function through both directly experienced and verbally mediated events.  RFT 
proposes that language and cognition are based on relational framing.  In essence, it 
is argued that individuals respond to one stimulus based on its relation to another 
stimulus.  However, this relational responding is under contextual control i.e. humans 
respond to events in terms of other events, and their response is shaped by the social-
verbal context in which it occurs.  Inherent in this relational learning is 
„bidirectionality‟, also known within RFT as „mutual entailment‟.  For example, if a 
person learns that A relates to B in a certain way, in a particular context, then they 
also learn there is some kind of relation between B and A in that context too.  More 
and more events or stimuli can then be compared, known as „combinatorial 
entailment‟, each in relation to each other.  Further responses can then be derived 
without having to be directly trained.  Essentially, when we think, speak, listen, or 
reason, we do so by deriving relations among events.  In this theory, „events‟ can 
also mean „words‟.  So, it is suggested humans derive relations among words and 
events, words and words, and events and events.  Certain contexts can then lead the 
non-arbitrary properties of the „events‟ to become less important than the arbitrary 
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property that we know as „symbolic meaning‟. For example, in a given context, the 
non-arbitrary properties of the word „disgust‟ (e.g. the sound of the word or the 
feeling of making the word with one‟s mouth) are much less important than the 
arbitrary properties (e.g. the feeling it represents). 
Furthermore, it is proposed that a defining property of relational framing is that it 
enables the transformation of stimulus functions i.e. the change in function of one 
stimuli within a particular relational network will result in the same function being 
transferred to other stimuli within the network (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2004). An 
example is given by Zettle (2007) of this process as applied to loss.  A man who has 
divorced and then hears his wedding song on the radio may experience emotional 
pain.  The stimulus function of the song has been transformed into something 
negative and painful.  In other words, relational frames allow people to experience 
pain regardless of the situation, so unable to control pain by situational means, they 
begin to try to avoid the painful thoughts and feelings themselves, leading to 
experiential avoidance.  Experiential avoidance is defined as the attempt to escape or 
avoid private events such as thoughts, feelings, memories, even when attempting to 
avoid them causes psychological harm (Hayes et al., 1996) and, as discussed in 
section 1.1.5.4., experiential avoidance is implicated by ACT in most forms of 
psychopathology, including depression (Giorgio et al., 2010).   
In this way, RFT suggests that basic language functions can exacerbate 
psychological difficulties.  Another example involves the process of combinatorial 
entailment, in which more and more relations are derived.  This occurs through a 
process of „comparative framing‟, with relations being compared and contrasted in 
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order to derive new relations.  It is proposed that this process of comparative framing 
will inevitably lead to a process of making comparative evaluations, which can then 
go on to include negative self-evaluations e.g. “I‟m not as pretty as her” (Zettle, 
2007).  It is of note that negative self-evaluations and self-discrimination is 
associated with depression and can be a feature of the content of depressive 
rumination. 
It is also proposed that basic language functions can lead to cognitive fusion (Hayes 
et al., 2001).  Relational networks are maintained by myriad derived relations and are 
automatically reinforced when people experience effective outcomes from relating 
events.  Eventually, stimulus functions from relational frames dominate over other 
sources of behavioural regulation, so that, according to Hayes (2004), the individual 
is „less in contact with the here and now experience and direct contingencies and 
more dominated by verbal rules and evaluations‟ (p.650).  In this way, an individual 
can become caught up in language and entangled with their thoughts, so thoughts can 
seem to be truths about the self, rules to be obeyed or events that require full 
attention.  The more the individual becomes fused with their thought, the more 
influence it has over their behaviour.  It is suggested by ACT that this process is 
complicit in maintaining depression (Zettle, 2007). 
Finally, it is proposed by RFT that relational framing promotes the use of rule-
governed behaviour.  It is suggested that, within depression, a form of rule-governed 
behaviour is „reason giving‟, in which reasons or causes are sought for private 
experiences.  Again, this appears to be a component of ruminative thought content.  
It has been suggested that people ruminate, at least in part, to find reasons or causes 
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for their depression (Zettle & Hayes, 1986).  This reason giving is deemed 
problematic because reasons which make reference to private events such as thoughts 
and feelings may begin to be believed as causes for the behaviour.  It is suggested by 
RFT that we learn at an early age, within the context of the social-verbal community, 
that thoughts and feelings are acceptable reasons for behaviour.  Thus, these private 
events become viewed as causal and necessary to change before other behaviours can 
be changed.  Furthermore, reason-giving promotes asking and answering “why am I 
depressed?” which, in turn, increases self-blame (Zettle, 2007).  Indeed, Addis and 
Jacobsen (1996) found that people with depression who could offer “good reasons” 
for their depressed behaviour tended to be more severely depressed and more 
difficult to treat than people who did not. 
In summary, within the RFT model, vulnerability to depression is context-dependent, 
and social-verbal learning is implicated throughout.  Processes such as experiential 
avoidance, self-evaluation, cognitive fusion and reason-giving are all implicated in 
relational framing and are all involved in initiating and maintaining depression.  
Furthermore, self-evaluation and reason giving are both suggested components of 
ruminative thought.  However, also implicated in the maintenance of 
psychopathology is cognitive fusion.  Furthermore, it is possible that cognitive fusion 
plays a role in promoting the ruminative process.  For example, the more fused a 
person is with their thoughts the more they may become entangled in self-
evaluations.  This may encourage both further reason-giving and attempts to avoid or 
escape the painful feelings evoked.  If reason-giving is a strategy of rumination, then 
greater cognitive fusion may drive increased rumination.  This will be explored 
further in section 1.4. 
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1.2.5.7.  Overlapping themes within the models of rumination 
Although the models reviewed propose differing explanations for why individuals 
engage in and maintain a ruminative cognitive style, some unifying themes emerge.  
They broadly propose that rumination is a cognitive activity in which people become 
immersed, which is repetitive and which is difficult to suppress.  However, the 
models appear to be broadly placed on a continuum between two distinct categories, 
when accounting for the mechanisms by which the mental process of rumination 
contributes to depression.  At one end of the continuum, explanations focus upon the 
content of thoughts in accounting for the role rumination plays within depression.  At 
the other end of the continuum, it is the context of thought processes which is 
identified as determining the relationship of cognitive processes such as rumination, 
with depression.  However, others are balanced between these two poles, placing 
emphasis on the interplay between these two categories in explaining the relationship 
between rumination and depression.  Closer analysis will now be given to two 
constructs which have been implicated in rumination and depression: metacognitive 








1.3 Metacognitive beliefs 
As discussed in section 1.2.5.5 the S-REF model hypothesises that metacognitive 
beliefs play a key role in the development and persistence of emotional disorders in 
general.  Furthermore, Wells and Matthews (1994) propose that the knowledge base 
(i.e. metacognitive beliefs) of emotionally vulnerable individuals is responsible for 
predisposing them to select and engage in rumination. 
 
1.3.1  Definition of metacognition 
Metacognitions refer to beliefs and appraisals about one’s thinking and 
the ability to monitor and regulate cognition. (Papegeorgiou & Wells, 
2001b, p.160). 
Generally, metacognition is understood as the process of thinking about thinking.  
However, within depression it is proposed that specific metacognitions regarding the 
benefits of rumination go on to drive the ruminative process i.e. the metacognitions 
associated with depression consist of positive beliefs about the benefits and 






1.3.2  The relationship between metacognitive beliefs, rumination and 
depression 
According to the metacognitive model of rumination and depression, individuals are 
initially motivated to engage in rumination because of a set of positive beliefs they 
hold about the advantages and benefits of rumination.  In the long-run however, they 
will begin to experience negative consequences of ruminating and will appraise this 
ruminative thinking as harmful and uncontrollable which, in turn, will fuel 
depressive feelings (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003, 2004).  Indeed this proposal that 
people who ruminate have underlying beliefs which support their rumination has also 
been advocated by Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema (1995) when they reported 
that dysphoric individuals who ruminated about their mood believed that rumination 
helped them to gain insight into their problems and emotions.  Watkins and Baracaia 
(2002) also found that the majority of dysphoric ruminators within their study 
reported at least one perceived benefit of rumination, such as believing it increased 
self awareness or helped them to solve problems.   
 
1.3.3  Relevant research on metacognitive beliefs 
In exploring their S-REF model and the role of metacognition, Papageorgiou and 
Wells (1999) carried out a study in which they used a semi-structured interview with 
participants with anxiety or depression.  They examined whether people have 
different metacognitions in relation to depressive and anxious perseverative thinking.  
They found that depressed participants believed that rumination was helpful for 
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solving problems and understanding their depression.  However, they also reported 
finding rumination to be uncontrollable and dangerous.  Within this study, a positive 
relation between self-reported depression and low confidence in problem-solving 
abilities (when controlling for anxiety) was also obtained.  Papageorgiou and Wells 
(2001a) went on to conduct further semi-structured interviews with patients with 
recurrent major depressive disorder and found that all of the patients held both 
positive and negative metacognitive beliefs about rumination.  From this, they went 
on to develop a metacognitive measure, the Positive Beliefs about Rumination Scale 
(PBRS), which asks specifically about positive beliefs regarding the uses and 
advantages of ruminating (Papageorgiou and Wells, 2001b).  The scale was 
developed using the metacognitive beliefs elicited from the previous interview-based 
study.  A pool of 16 items was derived from positive beliefs reported by patients in 
the study which were then revised to 9 items.  
Implementing the PBRS within a clinical sample, Papageorgiou and Wells (2001b) 
found that clinically depressed individuals held more positive beliefs about 
rumination, compared to those who had never been depressed.  However, it is noted 
that within this study they used a small sample (n=12 in each group).  In a similar 
study, Watkins and Moulds (2005) carried out a replication and extension, comparing 
adults with depression, adults recovered from depression and adults who had never 
been depressed.  Within this study they used an adapted version of the positive 
beliefs about rumination scale (PBRS-A) because of the possibility that there may be 
confounds within the original PBRS measure between the severity of depressed 
mood and endorsement of beliefs.  Watkins and Moulds (2005) highlighted that all 
nine items on the original PBRS refer to „rumination‟, and five items refer to „my 
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depression‟.  They suggested that depressed participants may endorse the items more 
than never-depressed participants simply because the PBRS reflects a more negative 
valence which is more consistent with the mood state and response bias of the 
depressed participants.  Items such as „I need to ruminate about my problems to find 
answers to my depression‟ were therefore changed to „I need to think about things to 
find answers to how I feel‟.  Within this larger scale study (n=98) Watkins and 
Moulds (2005) found that both recovered and currently depressed individuals 
endorsed comparable levels of positive beliefs about rumination, and that this was 
significantly greater than compared to those who had never been depressed.  They 
suggested that these findings supported the hypothesis that metacognitive beliefs 
about the benefits of rumination are not merely a function of mood state but may be a 
cognitive factor that is associated with depression recurrence.  They also endorsed 
the view that positive metacognitive beliefs about rumination increase the frequency 
of rumination which, in turn, increases depression severity.  It was concluded that the 
Papageorgiou and Wells (2001b) findings were not the result of methodological 
confounds such as criteria contamination in the PBRS or small sample size.  
However, one potential limitation of this study is that all participants were given both 
the PBRS and the PBRS-A to complete at the same time.  Overlap in responding may 
therefore have been due to response bias and criteria contamination may have 
continued to be an unanticipated issue regardless of the measures taken to prevent 
this. 
In two further larger scale studies, Papageorgiou and Wells (2003) went on to 
investigate the relationships between rumination, depression, and metacognition in 
adults with clinical depression (Study 1, n=200) and in adults without depression 
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(Study 2, n=200).  They used measures of metacognition, including the PBRS, and 
found that positive metacognitive beliefs were a predictor of rumination in both 
depressed participants (β = 0.31, p < .05) and in participants without depression (β = 
0.58, p < .05).  Similar findings were also reported in a study of depressed men and 
women with and without a history of assault (Barnhofer et al., 2006).  It is apparent 
that these cross-sectional studies all link metacognitive beliefs about the benefits of 
rumination with self-reported rumination.  However, few experimental studies have 
yet been carried out exploring this link.  An exception is Moulds and colleagues‟ 
recent (2010) laboratory-based study of 158 undergraduate students.  Within this 
study, two groups were selected of high and low ruminators.  One of three possible 
conditions was then applied across both groups: a laboratory-based stressor involving 
negative feedback on a forced-failure anagram task, positive feedback on the task, or 
no feedback on the task.  Participants with strong positive beliefs about the benefits 
of rumination reported more rumination about their performance, subsequent to the 
task, regardless of whether they received negative, positive or no feedback.  This was 
in spite of the feedback conditions having the intended effect on mood.  Furthermore, 
baseline measures in naturally-occurring (trait) rumination taken beforehand revealed 
that this difference between high and low ruminators after the task could not be 
attributed to any differences in trait rumination.  These findings further support the 
role of metacognition in rumination, however the authors acknowledge that they 
cannot make conclusions about the direction of the correlational relationships they 




Finally, studies examining the treatment outcome for therapies designed specifically 
to address metacognition in depression are scant.  One, more general, treatment 
outcome study which looked at the effectiveness of an Attention Training Technique 
(ATT; Wells, 1990) in the treatment of major depression, showed decreases in 
metacognition following treatment (Papageorgiou & Well, 2000).  In the ATT 
program, patients were encouraged to practice auditory monitoring exercises that 
required progressively greater attention, with phases of selective attention, attention 
switching and divided attention.  Measures of depression, rumination and 
metacognition taken at pre- and post-treatment and 12 month follow up showed 
substantial decrease at post-treatment which was maintained at follow-up.  
Papageorgiou and Wells (2004) suggest that further studies are required evaluating 
the effectiveness of specific strategies or techniques designed to modify 
metacognitive beliefs about rumination in depression. 
However, in spite of the somewhat limited evidence base for the role of 
metacognition in rumination and depression, findings thus far are promising and 
suggest that metacognitions in the form of beliefs about the benefits of rumination 
are common and proximal factors in determining the frequency and stability of 
rumination in samples that have a tendency to ruminate.  The inclusion of measures 
regarding metacognitions is therefore warranted in studies on the relationship 





1.4 Cognitive Fusion 
As explored in section 1.2.5.6, RFT proposes a key role for cognitive fusion in the 
development and maintenance of psychopathology generally, and in depression 
specifically.  RFT and ACT treatments for depression also suggest a theoretical link 
between cognitive fusion and ruminative thinking (Zettle, 2007).   
 
1.4.1 Definition of cognitive fusion 
Various definitions of cognitive fusion abound.  However, it is clear within the 
literature that fusion means more than simply „believability‟ or literality of thoughts.  
Instead, within the RFT model, cognitive fusion refers to contexts in which people 
get so caught up in the content of their thoughts that it dominates over other sources 
of behaviour regulation (Luoma et al., 2007).  In other words, „cognitive fusion‟ 
describes a process of entanglement in thoughts, so that verbal rules and evaluations 
dominate over contact with „here-and-now‟ experience, leading to an inability to 
psychologically distance the self from language-based internal events.  Healy and 
colleagues give the following explanation: 
In clinical terms, clients are described as being “fused” with their 
thoughts when they believe that their thoughts say something important 
about who they are. (2008, p. 623). 
For example, the thought “I‟m ugly” is no longer experienced as a thought or passing 
commentary, but as something „truthful‟ and important about who they are.  The 
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meaning of the thought is experienced as intensified and significant (e.g. “ I am 
really ugly and nobody could ever be attracted to me”) and feels distressing or 
painful.   
 
1.4.2 The relationship between cognitive fusion, rumination and 
depression 
According to the RFT model and ACT, the factors which can shift normal 
experiences of dysphoria into clinical depression are associated with language.  
Attempts to avoid, escape or control dysphoria, or simply to “not feel bad” (Hayes, 
2005), lead to further increased dysphoria and this ongoing downward spiral 
culminates in depression.  The kinds of avoidance strategies referred to here, are not 
activity based distraction and activation, but passive withdrawal, thinking and 
reason-giving (which is reinforced by the verbal culture).  The processes which are 
implicated in this spiral are language based, and it is recognised that rumination is a 
key contributor in the pathway from dysphoria to depression.  In this model, 
rumination can be seen as a perseverative attempt to problem-solve, in part by 
finding reasons for the depression, and this process then limits contact with the 
present moment (Zettle, 2007).  Indeed, in a self-report questionnaire study using 
undergraduates, reason-giving for depression, psychological inflexibility and 
depression were all found to be significantly related (Garst & Zettle, 2006).  RFT 
proposes that cognitive fusion is implicated in promoting this ruminative process.   
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Cognitive fusion is one of several processes which arises through social-verbal 
learning, and the functionality of this process, as with any behaviour, is context 
dependent.  It is therefore the case that some (internal and external) contexts will lead 
to greater fusion than others.  With increasing fusion, behaviour becomes 
increasingly directed by derived verbal stimulus relations and rules, rather than from 
direct contact with what actually works.  For this reason it is proposed that cognitive 
fusion may lead to attempts to „manage‟ thoughts in unworkable ways, such as 
through perseverative thought processes like rumination.  In attempting to reason 
away the depressive thoughts, ruminative content may become elaborated.  Similarly, 
researchers have found that attempts to suppress or avoid painful internal content 
often results in the strengthening of that content (Davies & Clark, 1998; Freeston et 
al., 1991).  Additionally, the ruminative process can result in a narrowing of 
behavioural repertoires and missed opportunities to learn from experience and move 
towards life values.  Within the RFT model it is argued that social and verbal 
learning teaches us that emotions and thoughts are valid causes for behaviour.  This 
encourages the use of emotions and thoughts as ways to regulate behaviour, which 
leads to a narrowing of behavioural responses.  In the case of rumination, this 
becomes problematic when reasons found for the depression during the ruminative 
process make reference to private events which are then seen by individuals as 
causes of the depression.  This leads to the perception that private events must 
themselves be changed or controlled in order to overcome the depression.   
Avoidant coping and reason-giving have been proposed to serve the function of 
experiential avoidance.  Symptoms such as anhedonia and feeling “numb”, described 
by those experiencing depression are proposed to function as escapes from emotional 
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distress (Zettle, 2007).  Within research studies, there are claims that experiential 
avoidance is implicated in depression.  For example, Tull and Gratz (2008) found 
that experiential avoidance as measured by the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire 
(AAQ; Hayes et al., 2004) mediated the severity of depression in participants.  
However, caution must be given in interpreting the results of studies using the AAQ.  
It is acknowledged by Hayes himself that the AAQ is often referred to as a measure 
of experiential avoidance but is actually more generally a measure of several ACT 
processes which bear on „psychological flexibility‟, including experiential avoidance, 
cognitive fusion and willingness to act in the presence of difficult private events 
(Hayes et al., 2006).   Using this general measure, it was found in a laboratory study 
by Gird and Zettle (2007) that participants with lower levels of psychological 
flexibility responded with significantly greater levels of distress to an induction of 
dysphoric mood even though intitial levels of mood were comparable.  Additionally 
and perhaps more significantly to our understanding of the role of experiential 
avoidance in depression, it was found in another laboratory study that participants 
with depression who were asked to suppress rather than accept their emotions 
displayed higher heart rates and significantly more negative affect when watching an 
emotion-provoking film (Campbell-Sill et al., 2006).  However, in looking 
specifically for evidence of the role of cognitive fusion in depression, empirical 





1.4.3 Relevant research on cognitive fusion 
In an early ACT outcome study for depression, an early version of ACT called 
Comprehensive Distancing was compared with Cognitive Therapy (Zettle & Hayes, 
1986), though the small sample size should be noted (n=6 in each group).  Post 12 
week treatment and at 2 month follow up depression scores were lower for the 
Comprehensive Distancing (CD) group.  Additionally, scores on the Automatic 
Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ; Hollon & Kendall, 1980) showed no difference 
between groups on the frequency of depressing thoughts but significantly reduced 
scores for the validity for reasons for dysfunctional behaviour scale were found in the 
CD group, as were scores for the believability of thoughts scale.  This outcome was 
interpreted as indicating that greater levels of cognitive defusion had occurred within 
the CD group.  In a later re-analysis of this data (Hayes et al., 2006), it was shown 
that the believability of depressogenic thoughts, as measured half-way though 
treatment, fully mediated outcomes at follow up.  However, it is also noted that 
„believability‟ is a narrow component of the more recently used definition of 
cognitive fusion within ACT theory. 
Another study which may be relevant to evidence the role of cognitive fusion in 
psychopathology is a study on psychosis, rather than depression.  In this study, Bach 
and Hayes (2002) compared ACT with treatment as usual (TAU) for patients with 
psychosis.  TAU consisted of medication, attendance at three or more 
psychoeducational groups and, for those hospitalised for more than a few days, 
individual psychotherapy sessions once a week.  After discharge, TAU included case 
management services and monthly medication review with a Psychiatrist.  
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Additionally, 60 per cent of outpatients within the TAU group also undertook 
psychosocial rehabilitation classes or psychotherapy.  At outcome, ACT group 
participants were found to be more likely to report psychotic symptoms but rated 
them as less believable, and were three times less likely to be readmitted to hospital 
than the TAU participants.  This finding was interpreted as an indication that 
cognitive defusion had occurred more in the ACT group and although participants 
still experienced cognitive symptoms, they were less likely to live as though they 
were true.  These findings have since been replicated (Gaudiano & Herbert, 2006a, 
2006b).  This suggests that ACT can provide benefits beyond symptom reduction 
and, again, indicates cognitive defusion processes may play a part in ACT outcomes.  
However, it is noteworthy that once again the narrow measure of „believability of 
thoughts‟ is being used as a „barometer‟ of cognitive fusion. 
 
In terms of assessing the specific ACT core component of cognitive fusion within 
depression, partial assessment of this process has been carried out in the studies 
already described by using the Reasons for Depression Questionnaire (RFD; Addis et 
al., 1995).  The RFD measures how much people believe that certain factors such as 
childhood are reasons or causes for the depression.  Additionally the Automatic 
Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ; Hollon & Kendall, 1980) which measures frequency 
of depressogenic thoughts has also been used.  This measure contains a scale for 
rating the believability of these thoughts.  As we can see, the studies mentioned have 
assessed only one aspect of cognitive fusion i.e. believability of thoughts.  More 
recently, a comprehensive self-report measure of cognitive fusion has been 
developed: the Cognitive Fusion Questionnaire (CFQ28; Gillanders et al., 2010).  
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This has also been shortened into a 13 item measure: the CFQ13.  Items on these 
scales address fusion with cognitions in general rather than with a specific set of 
cognitions.  Furthermore,  a broad range of aspects of cognitive fusion are explored, 
by questionnaire items, such as taking thoughts literally, seeing thoughts as reasons 
for action, taking a detached perspective on thoughts and overanalysing situations, 
rather than focussing solely on believability of thoughts.  Validity and reliability is 
now well established for this measure across 1074 adult community participants 
without psychological disorder, and 54 people recruited from a mixed mental health 
population with Axis I or Axis II disorders (Gillanders et al., 2010).  However, 
cognitive fusion as measured by the CFQ28 has not yet been researched specifically 
with adults with a diagnosis of depression. 
In terms of intervention component analysis, studies looking specifically at the 
process of cognitive defusion are slightly more abundant.  Cognitive defusion is one 
of the ACT treatment processes.  Techniques which address defusion are intended to 
create a „de-fused‟ perspective on psychological content thus permitting greater 
behavioural flexibility.  In effect, individuals are encouraged to view their thoughts 
as just thoughts, and themselves as more than just the sum of their thoughts and 
personal evaluations.   There is some indirect evidence to support efficacy of 
cognitive defusion strategies, such as the findings of a chronic pain cold pressor 
analog study in which an ACT protocol was applied which focused on acceptance 
and defusion (Takashi et al., 2002).  Within this study, participants (n=28) were 
randomly assigned to an acceptance and defusion exercise, an exercise designed to 
control pain or an attention-placebo control.   Only those in the acceptance and 
defusion group showed positive changes in pain tolerance.  However, it is noted that 
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assumptions cannot be made that changes were necessarily due to increased defusion 
per se. 
Perhaps a more relevant study is Masuda and colleagues (2004) time-series 
experimental analogue study using a cognitive defusion technique.  During this 
study, participants (n=8) were asked to think of two one-word negative self-relevant 
thoughts, such as stupid or fat, and then used a likert-type scale to rate the discomfort 
and the believability of each thought.  One of each pair of thoughts was then 
randomly allocated to a cognitive defusion exercise and the other to a control 
condition, such as distraction or thought control.    Participants received each 
intervention three times.  Results demonstrated that the defusion technique reduced 
both discomfort and believability of thoughts significantly more than the distraction 
and thought-control conditions.  Masuda and colleagues (2008) then carried out 
another two experimental studies of cognitive defusion, using 61 undergraduate 
participant in the first and 77 in the second.  In these studies they investigated the 
effects of the rapid repetition of a single word.  This is a technique introduced in 
1910 by Titchener, and it is suggested that when a word is rapidly repeated out loud, 
the context required for the word to have its literal meaning is altered and removed.  
In Masuda and colleagues‟ studies, participants were asked to think of a one-word 
negative self-relevant thought and then assigned to conditions of either being 
provided with a defusion technique rationale and brief training in the techniques, or 
the defusion rationale and training plus varying lengths of application of the defusion 
technique (either 3 seconds or 20 seconds word repetition in the first experiment, and 
either 1 second, 10 seconds or 30 seconds word repetition in the second experiment).  
Again, self-ratings on a likert-type scale were taken before and after for distress and 
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believability of the word.  It was found that, in combination with an applied rationale 
and training, the rapid repetition of a self-relevant negative thought reduced the 
thought‟s believability and emotional discomfort.  Emotional discomfort reduced 
relatively quickly, with 3 second and 10 seconds repetition being effective, whereas 
believability took longer to reduce, in the 20 to 30 second range.    Although word 
repetition is one of the many defusion techniques used in ACT treatment, these 
studies were limited in their ability to determine effectiveness as only non-clinical 
samples were used with one-word thoughts, rather than full sentences. 
In contrast, another study by Healy and colleagues (2008) investigated the impact of 
defusion on a nonclinical sample (n=60) in the context of negative and positive self-
statements which were presented to participants in either a defused or non-defused 
format.  The defusion component consisted of using the prefix “I am having the 
thought that…” before each statement, in order to highlight the subsequent statement 
as a thought and not a fact.  This is a technique frequently used in ACT clinical 
practice.  Measures of discomfort, willingness and believability of each of the 
statements were taken before and after they were presented to the participants.  No 
differences were found in response to the two different presentations of positive 
statements, however negative statements presented in the defused format resulted in 
decreased discomfort and believability ratings and increased willingness ratings 
relative to non-defused statements.   
These experimental studies seem to show that techniques which address cognitive 
fusion appear to reduce emotional discomfort and believability of thoughts in non-
clinical populations in the very short term.  However, larger scale studies of the 
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relationship between depression and cognitive fusion, as opposed to purely 
believability of thoughts, have not yet been carried out.  Similarly studies of the 
relationship between rumination and cognitive fusion have not yet been carried out, 
















1.5 Current study 
The metacognitive model predicts that positive beliefs about rumination leads to use 
of rumination as a strategy.  ACT predicts that the more fused people are with their 
thoughts, the more they will implement cognitive reason-giving strategies such as 
rumination.  Although the metacognitive model and ACT differ significantly in their 
underlying models and their clinical treatment applications, it is apparent that some 
overlap exists between them in their emphasis on the role of rumination in 
maintaining depression.  Furthermore, the models do not preclude the possibility that 
both processes are involved.  In exploring the evidence for the ACT and 
metacognitive theories of rumination and depression, it is apparent that research in 
these areas is limited.  As yet, only a few studies exist looking at the relationship 
between positive beliefs about rumination and levels of rumination in depression.  
The same applies for studies looking at cognitive fusion and depression.  
Furthermore, studies exploring cognitive fusion in depression have used measures 
which tap into only one facet of fusion i.e. believability, and these studies have 
neglected to include measures of rumination.   
 
1.5.1 Study Aims 
It is intended to explore the relationship between metacognitive beliefs, cognitive 
fusion, rumination and depression.  Furthermore, it is intended to include participants 
who have recovered from depression in the study.  This will help to partially reduce 
potential confounds between responses to the positive beliefs about rumination scale 
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and the cognitive fusion scale with responses about depression symptoms.  If fusion 
and positive beliefs are secondary to depression, then elevated scores should only be 
apparent during depressed episodes.  However, it is known that people who have 
recovered from depression still have elevated rumination scores therefore elevated 
fusion and positive beliefs in this group will support the hypothesis that both are 
implicated in ruminative processes. 
 
1.5.2 Hypotheses 
In order to specify the expected findings of this study, the following hypotheses will 
be tested: 
Between groups differences 
1.  In keeping with previous research findings, it is predicted that participants 
who are currently depressed will report higher levels of rumination than 
participants who have recovered from depression, and that they will, in turn, 
report higher levels of rumination than participants who have never 
experienced depression. 
2. Following the proposal that positive beliefs about rumination are a stable 
store of self-knowledge that are a vulnerability factor for rumination (Wells et 
al., 2009), it is predicted that both participants who are currently depressed 
and participants who have recovered from depression will report higher levels 
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of positive beliefs about rumination than participants who have never 
experienced depression. 
3. Based on the proposal that cognitive fusion promotes the use of ruminative 
strategies, it is predicted that both participants who are currently depressed 
and participants who have recovered from depression will report higher levels 
of cognitive fusion than participants who have never experienced depression. 
Relationships between the variables 
4. It is predicted that cognitive fusion will significantly correlate with both 
rumination and depression severity.   
5. It is predicted by the metacognitive therapy (MCT) and the acceptance and 
commitment therapy (ACT) models that the relationship between its 
components (i.e. positive beliefs about rumination and cognitive fusion, 
respectively) and rumination and depression, will be stronger.  Both of these 









Chapter 2: Methodology 
 
2.1  Design 
A between groups design was used comparing participant responses to a battery of 
five self-report questionnaires.  The responses of three independent groups were 
compared.  Group 1 was a sample of people meeting criteria for current major 
depressive disorder (DSM-IV-TR; APA, 2000) on the Structured Clinical Interview 
for DSM-IV (SCID; First et al, 1997).  Group 2 was a sample of people meeting 
criteria for no current depression or dysthymia but at least one past episode of major 
depression on the SCID, and a current CESD score of 15 or less.  Group 3 was a 
sample of people meeting criteria of no diagnosis of major depression or dysthymia 
in the present or past using the SCID, and a current CESD score of 15 or less.   
 
2.2  Participants 
Participants were recruited into three distinct groups; 
Group 1: Currently depressed (n = 26) 
Group 2: Recovered depressed (n = 21) 
Group 3: Never depressed (n = 27) 
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Participants for Group 1 and Group 2 were recruited from an Adult Primary Care 
population, both through General Practitioner (GP) services and Primary Care 
Psychological Services.  These services offer a stepped care approach to those with 
mild to moderate mental health difficulties, including depression and anxiety.  
Participants for Group 3 were recruited from a non-clinical general adult population 
through community groups and services. 
Participants were selected for the study using the following inclusion and exclusion 
criteria: 
 
2.3  Inclusion criteria 
2.3.1  Recruitment from GP services 
Three GP practices agreed to take part in the study directly.  All participants were 
NHS patients, aged 18 to 65, who had attended an appointment with their GP 
regarding their mood within the past four months, during the period 01/02/2010 to 
30/06/2010.  All participants who had received a new or ongoing diagnosis of 
depression from their GP, during this period, and whose details had been entered as 
such on the services‟ database (in which patients with depression are identified as 
part of the Quality Outcome Framework (QOF) guidelines) were invited to 
participate.  QOF is a voluntary incentive scheme for GP practices in the UK, which 
rewards them for how well they care for their patients.  Maintaining data on the 
number of patients diagnosed with depression is included as part of this scheme.   
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2.3.2  Recruitment from Primary Care Psychological services 
Three Primary Care Psychological services agreed to take part in the study, with 
consent from the nine GP practices they were attached to.  These were different 
practices from the two who took part directly (please see previous paragraph) in 
order to avoid potential participants being approached repeatedly.  All participants 
recruited through this route were NHS patients, aged 18 to 65, who had been referred 
by their GP to the Primary Care Psychological Service, known as „The Doing Well 
Clinic‟.  They were all awaiting their first appointment and had been first referred 
during the period 01/02/2010 to 30/06/2010.  Only those identified on the waiting list 
as having been referred for treatment of depression, and who had not yet been seen 
for assessment, were invited to participate. 
 
2.3.3  Recruitment from community groups and services 
Staff from three Secondary schools, members of a choir and members of two running 
clubs and a golf club agreed to take part in the study.  These were all services and 
groups that the researcher had had no previous contact with and were outside of the 
local community, in order to ensure having had no personal contact with individuals 
which may bias participant responses.  All participants recruited through this route 





2.4  Exclusion criteria 
Participants were excluded from the study if they had known organic brain disease or 
traumatic brain injury, had a learning disability, had known current co-morbid 
substance abuse problems, or had a formal diagnosis of post traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD), bipolar affective disorder or personality disorder.  Those who lacked 
English comprehension were also excluded due to all interview questions and 
questionnaires being presented in English.  Additionally, participants who had 
already received any form of cognitive-behavioural therapy were excluded in order 
to reduce any potential response bias to the questionnaires regarding cognitions.  The 
exclusion criteria were screened for at the first stage of identifying potential 
participants, either from the GP services‟ database or Primary Care Psychological 
Service waiting lists, and again when participants met with the researcher.  Similarly, 
this process also took place when the researcher met with Group 3 control 
participants. 
 
2.5  Sample size 
With regards to power analysis, it was estimated that the effects being explored in 
hypothesis 1 was likely to be of a large size.  This estimate was based on the large 
effect sizes (Cohen, 1992) reported by McIntosh et al. (2010) regarding group 
differences in rumination between adults with depression and adults with no history 
of depression (d =2.68). The effect being explored in hypothesis 2 was also estimated 
to be of a likely large effect size, as Papageorgiou & Wells (2001b) found that 
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positive metacognitive beliefs about rumination strongly predicted rumination 
(d=1.26).  For hypothesis 3 a large effect size was also predicted due to recent 
findings (Gillanders et al., 2010) regarding group differences in cognitive fusion 
between a student sample and a mixed clinical sample (d= 1.35). 
When comparing three groups, sample size calculations based on Cohen (1992) 
indicate that, with a between groups design, a minimum of 21 participants would 
need to be recruited into each group in order to achieve power of .80 and to detect a 
large effect at the p <.05 significance level.  With regard to carrying out a within 
subjects analysis in order to explore hypotheses 4 and 5, regression will be used with 
three predictor variables.  With this number of predictor variables and assuming a 
medium-sized relationship, Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) recommend a sample of 74 
or more to test the model fit of multiple regression.  It is therefore concluded that a 
minimum total sample size of 74, with about 24 participants in each of the three 
independent groups, is required in order to test each of the hypotheses. 
 
2.6  Ethical approval 
Ethical approval for this research project was sought prior to commencing data 
collection.  The project was assessed and approved by a Scottish Research Ethics 
Committee (see Appendix A for letter of ethical approval) and by the local Research 




2.7  Ethical Issues 
It was decided that potential participants for Groups 1 and 2 would not be 
approached by the researcher in the first instance, in order to ensure patient 
confidentiality was maintained.  Instead, they were first contacted in writing by the 
service that they were already known to; the GP practice or the Primary Care 
Psychological service (see Appendix C for example letter).  Potential participants 
were provided with an information sheet at this point and were provided with the 
contact details of the researcher and an independent clinician that they could ask any 
questions about the study (see Appendix D for example Group 1/2 information 
sheet).  Participants were invited to opt in to the study if they were interested in 
taking part, either by returning the reply slip, or making contact with the researcher 
by email or by telephone. 
Furthermore, only adults with a pre-established diagnosis of depression were invited 
to participate in the study, in order to avoid any potential ethical complications of 
identifying major depression in adults who were not already aware of their diagnosis.  
The ethical issue of potentially identifying underlying clinical mood problems within 
participants of the control group was also considered.  Within the participant 
information sheet for Group 3 (never depressed) participants it stated that, should any 
underlying clinical problems be detected through the interview process, they would 
be informed by the researcher and advised to contact their GP (see Appendix E for 
example Group 3 information sheet).  An item within the consent form, given at the 
point of contact with the researcher, gave the opportunity to consent to this (see 
Appendix F for example Group 3 consent form) and was a pre-condition of 
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involvement in the study.  This process was followed as it was deemed that not 
passing on information to the participant about an underlying mood disorder would 
be unethical. 
In addition, only community services and groups that were not personally known to 
the researcher and were not based within their local area were approached to take 
part in the study.  This was in order to ensure people did not feel obliged to 
participate and that the responses they gave were not biased through having personal 
contact with or knowledge of the researcher.  Instead, people were informed as a 
group of the project and information sheets were handed out, which also gave the 
contact details of the researcher and of an independent clinician that they could ask 
any questions about the study.  Participants were invited to opt in to the study if they 
were interested in taking part, either by returning the reply slip, or making contact by 
email or by telephone. 
Finally, the ethical issue of potential distress to participants who are currently 
experiencing mental health problems, when discussing and completing 
questionnaires which ask about their symptoms and thoughts, was considered.  This 
issue was addressed primarily by ensuring informed consent was sought.  The 
information sheet that participants were provided with, at the first point of contact, 
detailed what would be involved in the study and they were not contacted again 
unless they opted into the study.  When the researcher met individually with each 
participant, the issue of what would be involved in the study was covered again and 
the participant was provided with a consent form (see Appendix G for example 
Group 1/2 consent form).  Previous research was also taken into consideration, in 
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which similar research designs had been used (e.g. McIntosh et al., 2010) and in 
which any stress to participants had been found to be minor.    
 
2.8  Procedure for recruitment 
Ninety GP practices were contacted by the researcher, via the practice managers.  
They were each invited to participate in the study either directly or indirectly through 
the Primary Care Psychological Services attached to their practices.  Three GP 
practices agreed to take part directly, and another nine agreed to take part through the 
attached Primary Care Psychological service involvement i.e. a total of 13 percent of 
all GP practices approached agreed to take part in the study.  It is not known why the 
remaining 87 percent did not agree to take part.  However, in some cases concerns 
regarding the demand placed on administrative staff to carry out database and 
waiting list searches, and to send out invitation letters and information sheets, was 
cited.   
2.8.1  Recruitment directly from GP services 
All patients aged 18 to 65, who had attended an appointment with their GP during 
the four month period from 01/03/2010 to 30/06/2010, and had been given a new or 
ongoing diagnosis of depression, were invited to take part in the study. All such 
patients were identified by the GP practice administrative staff from the services‟ 
electronic database, in which patients with depression are identified as part of the 
Quality Outcome Framework (QOF) guidelines.   Data was cross-referenced for the 
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exclusion criteria and potential participants excluded as appropriate.   Only staff who 
routinely had access to this information were involved at this stage of the recruitment 
procedure.  Two hundred and eighteen people were identified and were sent 
invitation letters and information sheets about the study.  A stamped addressed 
envelope was also enclosed allowing the return of completed opt in slips.  Those 
participants who returned opt in slips or made contact with the researcher directly via 
email or telephone were met with independently by the researcher.  A total of 43 
individuals opted into the study (i.e. 20 percent of those contacted opted in).  18 
individuals were recruited into the currently depressed group and 19 were recruited 
into the recovered depressed group.  One individual was excluded at the point of 
screening by the researcher as they informed the researcher that they also had a 
diagnosis of borderline personality disorder.  A further 5 individuals opted in and 
made contact with the researcher but did not go on to attend the arranged 
appointment to meet.  The attrition rate through this particular recruitment pathway 
was therefore 12 percent of those who had initially opted in.  All of the 37 
participants recruited through this pathway were being prescribed antidepressant 
medication and were continuing to be monitored by their GP.  Please refer to figure 1 
for a flow diagram of recruitment, response and attrition rates. 
2.8.2  Recruitment from Primary Care Psychological services 
Three Primary Care Psychological services agreed to take part in the study, with 
consent from the nine GP practices they were attached to.  All patients aged 18 to 65, 
who had been referred by their GP to the Primary Care Psychological Service during 
the seven month period of 01/11/2009 to 30/06/2010, for assessment and treatment of 
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depression, were invited to participate.  Only those on the waiting list, who had not 
yet been seen for assessment, were contacted.  Again, the inclusion and exclusion 
criteria were used to guide selection.  This selection process was carried out by the 
Primary Care Mental Health Workers within the services, who already routinely had 
access to this information.  One hundred and seven people were identified and were 
sent invitation letters and information sheets about the study by the services‟ 
administrative staff.  A stamped addressed envelope was also enclosed allowing the 
return of completed opt in slips.  Those participants who returned opt in slips or 
made contact with the researcher directly via email or telephone were met with 
independently by the researcher.  A total of 12 individuals opted into the study (i.e. 
11 percent of those contacted opted in).  Following the screening and interview 
process 8 individuals were recruited into the currently depressed group and 2 were 
recruited into the recovered depressed group.  The attrition rate through this 
particular recruitment pathway was 0, however 2 individuals were excluded as they 
met DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for PTSD rather than major depressive disorder.  
Three participants recruited through this pathway were being prescribed 
antidepressant medication i.e. 30 percent of those who had opted in through this 
recruitment pathway and who met inclusion criteria (two within the currently 
depressed group and one within the recovered depressed group).  Please refer to 
figure 1 for a flow diagram of recruitment, response and attrition rates. 
2.8.3  Recruitment from community groups and services 
A variety of community groups and services were contacted by the researcher, and 
information was provided detailing the aims and procedure of the study.  The 
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researcher then requested permission to provide group / service members with 
information sheets about the study, with the purpose of recruiting participants to 
Group 3 (never depressed).  All those services contacted agreed to information being 
distributed.  The researcher went to each community group / service and gave a brief 
presentation about the project to the group members, including information about the 
inclusion and exclusion criteria for participants being sought, and then distributed 
information sheets which also detailed the researcher‟s contact details for interested 
participants to reply to, either via telephone or email.  Staff from three secondary 
schools, members of a choir and members of two running clubs and a golf club 
agreed to take part in the study.  A total of 27 people responded and were met with 
independently by the researcher.  All 27 participants were recruited into the never 
depressed group, following the screening and diagnostic interview with the 
researcher. 
 
2.9  Procedure for individual participant meeting with researcher 
Once participants had opted into the study, an individual thirty minute appointment 
was arranged with them.  Each participant was met with once only.  At the start of 
the meeting, an opportunity was given for any questions about the study to be asked.  
The consent forms were then completed.  After this, inclusion and exclusion criteria 
were screened for again and basic demographic information was gathered.  This was 
carried out by asking a set of pre-prepared questions.  These were “How old are 
you?”, “Do you have a current diagnosis of any of the following; organic brain 
disease, traumatic brain injury, learning disability, substance abuse problems, post 
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traumatic stress disorder, bipolar affective disorder, personality disorder?”, and “Are 
you currently taking antidepressant medication?”.  Following this, participants were 
then selected into one of the three groups (depressed, recovered depressed and never 
depressed) with the use of a brief diagnostic interview, the Structured Clinical 
Interview for DSM-IV (SCID; First et al., 1997).  Those who met criteria for current 
or previous depression were also asked how many episodes of depression they had 
experienced in total, and how old they were when they first experienced depression.  
The participant was then supported to complete a battery of self-report questionnaire 
measures.  The brief diagnostic interview and questionnaire measures are discussed 
in further detail. 
2.9.1  Diagnostic interview 
Participants within Group 1 must have a primary diagnosis of clinical depression to 
be included in the study, and participants within Group 2 must have had a previous 
experience of clinical depression from which they have now recovered.  Referrals to 
outpatient psychology services and patients attending Primary Care GP services tend 
to experience a mix of psychological disorders including anxiety, post-traumatic 
stress disorder and others.  A diagnostic interview, the Structured Clinical Interview 
for DSM-IV (SCID; First et al., 1997), was carried out with all participants to 
confirm the diagnoses.  This structured clinical interview follows a set list of 
questions asking about mood and depressive symptoms both within the past month 
and at any time in the past.  The SCID has been found to have good reliability and 
validity in the diagnosis of Axis I disorders (First et al., 1997).  The diagnostic 
interviews were audio-recorded in order for a twenty percent sample to be screened 
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blind by the academic research supervisor (Dr David Gillanders) who has prior 
experience of using the SCID.  This was in order to confirm the reliability of the 
diagnoses.  This requirement was detailed in the information sheet each participant 
had been provided with and written consent to carry out audio-recordings was sought 
at the start of each individual meeting with the researcher (see Appendix H for 
example consent form).  There was 100 per cent agreement regarding the presence or 
absence of current or previous major depression between the author and the 
academic research supervisor. 
2.9.2  Questionnaire measures 
Participants were supported to complete a battery of five self-report questionnaires 
measuring depressive symptoms, rumination, positive beliefs about rumination, 
experiential avoidance and cognitive fusion.  The questionnaires are as follows. 
2.9.2.1  Centre for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977) 
This is a measure of current level of depressive symptomatology and consists of 20 
items rating the frequency with which different symptoms have been experienced 
within the past week (see Appendix I).  Example questionnaire items are “I felt 
lonely or sad” and “I felt I could not get going”.  It emphasises the affective 
symptoms of depression and is widely used in both research and clinical settings 
(Thase & Lang, 2004).  The CES-D was used within this study because it has been 
developed for assessing depression in the general population and was therefore felt to 
be a sensitive measure of depression amongst both control and clinical sample 
participants.  Total scores have a possible range from 0 to 60, with higher scores 
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indicating higher levels of depressive symptoms.  The clinical cut-off score for 
depression is 16 or more. 
2.9.2.2  Short Response Styles Questionnaire (SRSQ; Nolen-Hoeksema & Jackson, 
2001) 
The SRSQ was derived from the original Ruminative Styles Questionnaire (RSQ; 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991).   The RSQ comprises a Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS) 
and a Distracting Responses Scale (DRS).  The RRS is a 22 items scale evidencing 
very high internal reliability with Cronbach‟s a ranging from .88 to .92 (Bagby et al., 
1999; Just & Alloy, 1997; Nolan et al., 1998; Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 1999; 
Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; Nolen-hoeksema et al., 1994).  Items focus 
either on the meaning of rumination, on the subjective feelings related to the 
depressed mood, on symptoms, and on consequences or causes of the mood.    More 
recently a short version of the scale has been developed (Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Jackson, 2001) which contains 10 items from the original list of 22 (Appendix J).  
The 10 items are of different self-evaluative thoughts which are self-focussed and 
symptom-focussed, such as “I think about how sad I feel” and “I think about my 
feelings of fatigue and achiness”.  In general, the scale measures a respondent‟s 
tendency to adopt a ruminative self focus in response to depressed mood.   The scale 
was obtained by selecting the items that had the highest item-total correlations with 
the total score.   It is noted by Luminet (2004) that the short version is highly related 
to the full version of the scale (r = .90) and has a high level of internal reliability 
(Cronbach‟s α = .85).  The respondents indicate on a four point Likert-type scale the 
frequency with which they engage with these thoughts when upset, from 1 („almost 
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never‟) to 4 („almost always‟), resulting in total possible scores ranging from 10 to 
40.  Higher scores on the SRSQ represent more frequent rumination.   
2.9.2.3  Positive Beliefs about Rumination Scale - Adapted (PBRS-A, Watkins & 
Moulds, 2005) 
This is a measure of metacognitive beliefs about rumination (Appendix K) which 
was adapted from Papageorgiou & Wells (2001b) original Positive Beliefs about 
Rumination Scale.  The original nine items, rating the extent to which participants 
agree with different statements that recurrent thinking and, in particular, recurrent 
thinking about feelings is helpful, were kept.  However, they were rephrased to 
remove direct mentions of rumination and depression, and to reduce references to 
negative moods and events.  For example, the item “I need to ruminate about my 
problems to find answers to my depression” was rephrased as “I need to think about 
things to find answers to how I feel”, and the item “Ruminating about the past helps 
me to prevent future mistakes and failures” was rephrased as “Thinking about the 
past helps me to prevent future mistakes and failures”.  This was in order to reduce 
potential confounds within the original measure between severity of depressive 
moods and endorsement of beliefs about depressive rumination (i.e. criterion 
contamination).  The original PBRS has high internal consistency (α = 0.89), and 
good test-retest reliability over six weeks (r = .85) (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001b).  
The PBRS-A has good internal consistency (α = 0.89) and is reported as significantly 




2.9.2.4  Cognitive Fusion Questionnaire (CFQ28; Gillanders et al., 2010) 
This is a recently developed measure of cognitive fusion (Appendix L) from which a 
shorter 13 item measure has also been extrapolated: the CFQ13 (Appendix M).  The 
CFQ28 consists of 28 items rated by respondents on a seven point Likert-type scale 
for how “true” each statement is for them, from 1 („never true‟) to 7(„always true‟) .  
Items address fusion with cognitions in general rather than with a specific set of 
cognitions.  The questionnaire also addresses a broad range of aspects of cognitive 
fusion, such as taking thoughts literally, seeing thoughts as reasons for action, taking 
a detached perspective on thoughts and overanalysing situations, rather than just 
focussing on the believability of thoughts.  According to Gillanders et al. (2010) the 
CFQ13 has been found to have good internal consistency (α = 0.85) as has the 
CFQ28 (α = 0.86).  Furthermore, good test-retest reliability has been found (r=.79, 
p<.001) (Campbell, 2010) and convergent validity is well established via 
correlational analysis with other measures (e.g. Dempster, 2009).  Validity and 
reliability is now well established across 1074 adult community participants without 
disorder, and 54 people recruited from mental health populations (Gillanders et al., 
2010).  Total scores on this questionnaire range from a possible 28 to 196, with 
higher scores representing greater levels of cognitive fusion and lower scores 
representing greater levels of cognitive defusion.  The full CFQ28 was administered 
and total scores for the CFQ13 where then extrapolated during the data analysis.  Use 
of the full scale of 28 items allowed for a subsequent further item extrapolation and 
analysis, in order to address any potential concerns regarding measurement overlap 
between the SRSQ and the CFQ13.  This process is discussed further in section 3.5. 
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2.10  Data analysis 
Quantitative data from the completed questionnaires were analysed by the researcher 
using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, Version 19.0.   
A series of one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) were used to examine 
preliminary hypotheses regarding differences between the three groups (currently 
depressed, recovered, never depressed) on measures of depressive symptoms, 
rumination, positive beliefs about rumination and cognitive fusion.  Group 
differences were then investigated using Games-Howell post hoc comparisons. 
In the second stage of analysis, a path analysis was conducted through the use of a 
series of multiple regressions (with bootstrapping) using the entire sample, as 
described by Bramwell (1996), with a maximum of three variables explored at any 
one time.  This allowed a test of the relationships between depressive symptoms, 
rumination, positive beliefs about rumination and cognitive fusion.  In order to 
address potential concerns about measurement overlap, a further path analysis was 
carried out (also with bootstrapping) using extrapolated CFQ28 items.  Items which 
were most rumination-related were removed from the CFQ28 data and the analysis 








Chapter 3: Results 
3.1  Overall sample characteristics 
3.1.1  Response and attrition rates 
In recruiting for the currently depressed and recovered depressed groups, a total of 
325 individuals were invited to take part in the study.  A total of 55 individuals 
agreed to be involved, indicating an initial response rate of 17 per cent.  However, 5 
of these individuals did not attend the subsequent appointment arranged, so the final 
response rate was 15 per cent.  The attrition rate was therefore almost 10 per cent of 
those who had initially agreed to take part.  It is not known why these individuals 
changed their mind about taking part.  Following the diagnostic interview, a further 3 
participants were removed from the sample as they met some of the exclusion criteria 
– one had a diagnosis of borderline personality disorder and the other two met 
diagnostic criteria for PTSD.  The remaining 47 were allocated to the currently 
depressed and the recovered depressed groups (N=26 and N=21 respectively).  See 
figure 1 for a flow diagram of recruitment and response rates for these two groups. 
All participants recruited from community groups and services for the never 






3.1.2  Demographic information 
A total sample size of 74 was obtained, 43 female and 31 male.  Participant age 
ranged from 21 to 65, with an average age of 42.8 years (SD = 11.3).  The gender 
distribution and mean ages of participants within each of the three groups is detailed 
in table 1.  There were no significant differences between each of the three groups in 
terms of age or gender. 
 
Table 1.  Distribution of age and gender (N=74) 













Male         11  (42) 9   (43) 11  (41) 
Female     15  (58) 12  (57) 16  (59) 
Age (years) 







SD = standard deviation 
 
Eighty-five per cent of those who had previously or currently experienced depression 
reported taking antidepressant medication at the time of inclusion in the study; 77 per 
cent of the currently depressed group and 95 per cent of the recovered depressed 
group.  None of the never depressed group reported doing so.  Of those who had 
experienced depression, the age of first onset of depression ranged from 14 to 49 
years for those within the recovered depressed group and from 14 to 58 years within 
the current depressed group.  The number of episodes experienced of depression 
(including the current episode) ranged from 1 to 10 in both the currently depressed 
and the recovered depressed group, and with a modal number of 2 episodes within 
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both groups.  Within the recovered depressed group, the amount of time reported to 
have elapsed since the last episode of depression ranged from 1 month to 4 years.  
Due to the large range in time since recovery within the recovered depressed group, 
correlations between time since recovery and performance on the measures were 
checked.  No significant correlations were found so this does not appear to be a 
variable which has to be controlled for.  Further information about the characteristics 
of the sample is detailed in table 2. 
Table 2. Sample characteristics (N=74) 
 














Age of first onset of 
depression (years) 













Number of depressed 
episodes 













Time elapsed since last 
episode (months) 













SD = standard deviation 
 
Comparison of the currently depressed group and the recovered depressed group 
indicated that there were no significant differences between them in the number of 






























90 GP practices approached 
to take part in the study   
3 GP practices 
agree direct 
involvement 
9 GP practices agree 
indirect involvement 












lists and invited by 
letter 
43 patients opt in 12 patients opt in 
20% opt in  
direct from 
GPs 


























2 excluded – 
PTSD 
symptoms 
5 DNA i.e. 12% 
attrition from 
original 43 = revised 
opt in rate of 17 % 
direct from GP 
practices 
26 currently depressed,  











Total of 55 opt 
in: 17% 
response rate 
Total of 47 remain:  
37 from GP 
practices,  
10 from waiting 
lists, 
 8 excluded / DNA 
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3.2  Initial exploration of the data 
At the first stage of analysis, data were analysed to detect any errors, outliers or 
missing values and explore statistical distribution.  This was carried out through 
visual inspection of boxplots and histograms, and employment of distribution 
statistics for each dependent variable, for both the between-groups analysis and for a 
whole sample analysis.  The dependent variables explored were depression 
symptoms (as measured by the CESD), rumination (as measured by the SRSQ), 
cognitive fusion (as measured by the CFQ13) and positive beliefs about rumination 
(as measured by the PBRS-A).   
3.3  Between groups comparisons 
3.3.1  Exploration of data for between groups analysis 
Distribution was checked using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and all variables were 
found to be normally distributed, except for the CESD scores within both the 
recovered depressed group D (21) = .193, p < .05) and the never depressed group D 
(27) = .207, p < .01).  As would be expected by the CESD selection criteria, values 
were skewed within these groups.  However, as the CESD scores were not the 
subject of a between groups analysis, and variance amongst all other variables was 
sufficiently similar across the groups, it was concluded that assumptions for 





3.3.2  Between groups analysis 
Hypothesis 1, 2 and 3 were explored by comparing the scores on each of the 
measures of rumination (SRSQ), positive beliefs about rumination (PBRS-A) and 
cognitive fusion (CFQ13) using a series of one-way analyses of variance 
(ANOVAs), with three independent  groups (Group 1: currently depressed, Group 2: 
recovered depressed, Group 3: never depressed).  The Levene Statistic was analysed 
for the Test of Homogeneity of Variances.  It was found that the Levene Statistic was 
non-significant for all variables except for the SRSQ.  For the SRSQ, a significant 
difference was found in terms of variance between groups (F[2,71] = 5.46, p < .01).  
As described by Field (2009), in cases such as this, where the assumption of 
homogeneity of variance is violated, a one-way ANOVA can still be applied but with 
the Welch F-ratio being reported for the SRSQ variable instead, as it controls the 
Type I error rate well. 
Table 3 shows the mean scores and standard deviations for each measure.  
Additionally, for each measure analysed in the between-groups comparison the F-
statistics and p-values associated with these are also detailed.  Significant group 
differences were found on measures of rumination (SRSQ: F[2,71] = 110.549, p < 
.001), cognitive fusion (CFQ13: F[2,71] = 80.785, p < .001) and positive beliefs 
about rumination (PBRS-A: F[2,71] = 4.192, p < .05).  Please note that for the 
SRSQ, the Welch F-ratio is reported because the assumption of homogeneity of 





Table 3.  Results by group 






F (df2,71) Significance 
Total CESD* 34.19 (10.48) 10.38 (4.28) 5.33 (3.27) N/A N/A 
Total SRSQ 31.58 (4.26) 23.10 (6.62) 16.41 (2.99) 110.55 ** < .001 
Total PBRS-A 26.54 (7.20) 24.76 (5.88) 21.3 (6.79) 4.19 < .05 
Total CFQ13 68.77 (11.86) 41.05 (12.42) 30.52 (9.53) 80.79 < .001 
* A score of 15 or more indicates clinical depression 
**  Welch F statistic SD = standard deviation 
 
Games-Howell post hoc multiple comparisons allowed further exploration of where 
the significant group differences lay.  Mean differences and significance values are 
detailed in table 4.  This method was used as it does not rely on the assumption of 
equal variances and remains accurate when sample sizes are unequal (Field, 2009).  
Results are as follows. 
Hypothesis 1: Group differences in rumination 
Post hoc comparisons revealed that mean rumination scores were significantly higher 
in the currently depressed group (M=31.58, 95% CI[29.86, 33.30]) than in both the 
recovered depressed group (M=23.10, 95% CI[20.08, 26.11]), p < .001, and the 
never depressed group (M= 16.41, 95% CI[15.22, 17.59]), p < .001.  Also, mean 
rumination scores were significantly higher in the recovered depressed group 
(M=23.10, 95% CI[20.08, 26.11]) than the never depressed group (M= 16.41, 95% 
CI[15.22, 17.59]), p < .01). 
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These findings support hypothesis 1 in which it was predicted that participants who 
are currently depressed would report higher levels of rumination than participants 
who have recovered from depression, and that they would, in turn, report higher 
levels of rumination than participants who have never experienced depression. 
Hypothesis 2: Group differences in positive beliefs about rumination 
Post hoc comparisons revealed that positive beliefs about rumination scores were 
significantly higher in the currently depressed group (M=26.54, 95% CI[23.63, 
28.44]) than the never depressed group (M=21.30, 95% CI[18.61, 23.98], p < .05.  
Comparisons between the recovered depressed group (M=24.76, 95% CI[22.08, 
27.44]) and the other two groups were not statistically significant at p < .05.   
These findings only partially support hypothesis 2 in which it was predicted that both 
participants who are currently depressed and participants who have recovered from 
depression would report higher levels of positive beliefs about rumination than 
participants who have never experienced depression.  Significant group differences 
in the levels of positive beliefs about rumination held were only apparent between 
the currently depressed group and the never depressed group.   
Hypothesis 3: Group differences in cognitive fusion 
Post hoc comparisons revealed that cognitive fusion scores were significantly higher 
in the currently depressed group (M=68.77, 95% CI[63.98, 73.56]) than in the never 
depressed group (M=30.52, 95% CI[26.75, 34.29]), p < .001.  Also, cognitive fusion 
scores were significantly higher in the recovered depressed group (M=41.05, 95% 
CI[35.39, 46.70]) than in the never depressed group (p < .01).  Notably, there was 
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also a significant difference between the currently depressed group and the recovered 
depressed group (p < .001). 
These findings support hypothesis 3, in which it was predicted both participants who 
are currently depressed and participants who have recovered from depression will 
report higher levels of cognitive fusion than participants who have never experienced 
depression. 
Table 4.  Games-Howell post hoc comparisons 




Depressed        Recovered 
                         Never 
Recovered        Depressed 
                         Never 
Never               Depressed 













PBRS-A Depressed        Recovered 
                         Never 
Recovered        Depressed 
                         Never 
Never               Depressed 













CFQ13 Depressed        Recovered 
                         Never 
Recovered        Depressed 
                         Never 
Never               Depressed 

















3.4  Whole sample analysis 
3.4.1  Exploration of data for whole sample analysis 
According to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, all variables were found to be 
significantly non-normal, apart from the PBRS-A.  A positive skew was found for 
the distribution of both the CESD scores D(74) = 0.2, p < .001) and the CFQ13 
scores D(74) = 0.1, p < .1).  Bimodal distribution was found for the SRSQ scores 
D(74) = 0.16, p < .001).  Log10 transformation was therefore carried out to 
normalise the dataset for the CESD, CFQ13 and SRSQ scores.  Although this was 
successful for the CESD and CFQ13 scores, it was not for the SRSQ scores.  Square 
root transformations, reciprocal transformations and reverse score transformations 
were also carried out on the SRSQ data without success.  Due to the issue of data not 
conforming to the assumption of normality, a bootstrapping technique was used 
when carrying out multiple regression.  This procedure is a robust method which can 
be used when assumptions about distribution of data have been violated (Field, 
2009), thus reducing the danger of Type I error.  Correlations between the predictor 
variables are presented in table 5 and results for the multiple regression are shown in 
table 6.  The variables were all significantly correlated. 




















*p < .05     **p < .01     ***p < .001 
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3.4.2  Path analysis using multiple regression 
To explore further both the direct and indirect relationships between the variables, a 
path analysis was conducted using the multiple regression method suggested by 
Bramwell (1996).  Although this technique cannot be used to infer causality, it can 
tell us how well a model fits the data by looking at the prediction of variance 
achieved.  In the path model, the coefficients on the paths represent the relative 
strength of relationships between variables, whilst the sign of the coefficient 
indicates the direction of the relationship.  These values are the standardised beta 
coefficients obtained from multiple regressions.  See figure 2 for the path model.   
Table 6.  Multiple regression 
 B SE B β 
Step 1 
   Constant (Depression) 
   Cognitive fusion 
   Rumination 

















   Constant (Rumination) 
   Cognitive fusion 














   Constant (Cognitive fusion) 










B = Beta coefficient    *p < .05     **p < .01     ***p < .001 
SE B = Bootstrapped standard error  
β = Standardised beta coefficient 
NS = Not significant 
 
Note: R² = .76 for Step 1, ∆R² = .69 for Step 2, ∆R² = .11 for Step 3 
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Figure 2.  Path analytic model of relationships between cognitive fusion, positive 
beliefs about rumination, rumination and depression 
      
    e = .31     e = .24 
Cognitive Fusion  
 
 
   .76***    .66*** 
 
.33**   Rumination  .28*  Depression 
          
   .18*    -.10 
 
 
Positive Beliefs About Rumination 
 
*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 
 
Hypotheses 4 and 5: Exploration of the relationships between depression, 
rumination, positive beliefs about rumination and cognitive fusion 
A comparison of the direct paths in the model reveals that cognitive fusion is a very 
strong predictor of rumination (β = 0.76, p < .001) and a very strong predictor of 
depression scores (β = 0.66, p < .001).  This finding supports hypothesis 4 in which it 
was predicted that cognitive fusion would significantly predict both rumination and 
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depression symptoms.  In addition, rumination is a predictor of depression symptoms 
(β = 0.28, p < .05), positive beliefs about rumination and cognitive fusion are 
correlated significantly (β = 0.33, p < .01), and positive beliefs about rumination and 
rumination are correlated significantly (β = 0.18, p < .05).  In contrast, it is apparent 
from the model that the relationship between positive beliefs about rumination and 
depression symptoms is not significant (β = -0.10, p > .05). 
To calculate the strength of an indirect pathway between two variables, the relevant 
path coefficients are multiplied.  For example, the strength of the path from cognitive 
fusion, through rumination to depression (0.76 x 0.28 = 0.21; p < .05) is significant.  
However, it is noted that the direct relationship from cognitive fusion is stronger than 
this moderated relationship (.66 versus .21).  In contrast, the strength of the path 
from positive beliefs about rumination, through rumination to depression (0.18 x 
0.28 = 0.05; p > .05) is not significant.  With regard to hypothesis 5, this finding 
suggests greater support for the predictions made by the ACT model than by the 
MCT model: The relationship between cognitive fusion, rumination and depression 
has been found to be stronger than the relationship between positive beliefs about 
rumination, rumination and depression.   
The strength of the indirect path from positive beliefs about rumination, through 
cognitive fusion and rumination to depression (0.33 x 0.76 x 0.28 = 0.07; p > .05) is 
also not significant.  Similarly, the indirect path from cognitive fusion, through 
positive beliefs about rumination and rumination to depression (0.33 x 0.18 x 0.28 = 
0.01; p > .05) is not significant.  This indicates that although cognitive fusion and 
positive beliefs about rumination are correlated (as depicted by the strength of the 
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direct path between them), they do not share a lot of variance in accounting for the 
presence of either rumination or depression. 
Of particular note in the path analysis is the final error term for prediction of 
depression from the whole model, (1 – R²: e = 0.24).  This means that 76% of the 
variance in depression symptoms is accounted for by the variables included in the 
full model.  Overall, the path model suggests that cognitive fusion does show a 
significant association with depression and with rumination.  However, it is 
understood that these are statistical associations and that this research design cannot 
infer causality. 
 
3.5  Concerns Over Conceptual and Measurement Overlap 
In order to address any potential concerns about the risk of conceptual overlap 
between the rumination measurement (SRSQ) and the cognitive fusion measurement 
(CFQ13), a further analysis of the full cognitive fusion scale (CFQ28) was carried 
out.  According to the definitions of rumination and cognitive fusion explored in the 
introduction, rumination is about the frequency of having certain types of content 
specific thought, whereas cognitive fusion is about the degree to which thoughts are 
seen as reasons for action, taken as meaningful or significant about the self, or 
experienced as difficult to distance the self from.  In order to reduce any confounds 
in the measure between cognitive fusion and rumination, all of the items of the full 
scale CFQ28 were checked for face validity.  Any items which appeared to tap into 
the content of thoughts or items, or which could be interpreted as definitions for 
rumination rather than fusion (such as „I get very focussed on my distressing 
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thoughts), were excluded.  In total, fourteen of the twenty-eight original items were 
excluded.  A full list of the items included and excluded from the adapted CFQ is 
given in table 7. 
It is of note that only seven of the remaining items in this adapted version of the CFQ 
are also present in the shortened CFQ13, which was used in the previous analysis.  
The remaining seven items are not included in the CFQ13.  As the full scale CFQ28 
had been administered with participants, it was possible to extract data for the 
amended version of the CFQ.  This new scale, using different items, remained 
reliable (α = .902). 
The direct and indirect relationships between the variables were explored again with 
a path analysis using the multiple regression method suggested by Bramwell (1996), 










Table 7.  Items included and excluded from adapted Cognitive Fusion Scale. 
Items included Items excluded 
I tell myself I shouldn‟t be thinking the way  
     I‟m thinking 
Even when I am having distressing thoughts,  
     I know that they may become less  
     important eventually* 
I make judgements about whether my    
     thoughts are good or bad 
Even when I am having distressing thoughts,     
     I can see that those thoughts may not be    
     literally true* 
I feel like my thoughts need to change before  
     I can have a good life 
I find it easy to view my thoughts from a  
     different perspective* 
I think some of my thoughts are bad or  
     inappropriate 
I can watch my thoughts from a distance  
     without getting caught up in them* 
It is ok to have inconsistent thoughts on the  
     same subject* 
It‟s possible to have negative thoughts about  
     myself and still know that I am an ok    
     person* 
 I am able to do what‟s important in my life  
     even when I am having upsetting 
thoughts* 
I can do difficult things even if my thoughts  
     say they are impossible to do.* 
I can be aware of my thoughts without  
     necessarily reacting to them* 
I need to control the thoughts that come into  
     my head 
My thoughts cause me distress or emotional    
     pain 
I find myself preoccupied with the future or  
     past 
I get upset with myself for having certain  
     thoughts 
I tend to get very entangled in my thoughts 
I feel upset when I have negative thoughts     
     about myself 
I get very focussed on distressing thoughts 
It‟s such a struggle to let go of upsetting  
     thoughts even when I know that letting go  
     would be helpful 
My thoughts distract me from what I‟m  
     actually doing 
I over-analyse situations to the point where  
     it‟s unhelpful to me 
I struggle with my thoughts 
Once I‟ve thought about something upsetting  
     it‟s difficult for me to focus on anything  
     else 
I tend to react very strongly to my thoughts 
I get so caught up in my thoughts that I 
forget  
     what I am actually doing 
I get so caught up in my thoughts that I am  
     unable to do the things I most want to do 
 
*Reverse scores used for these items 
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3.5.1  Exploration of data for whole sample re-analysis 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests demonstrated normal distribution for the amended 
CFQ scores (CFQ-A).  However, as previously noted, distribution of CESD and 
SRSQ scores were not normal.  Again, due to the issue of data not conforming to the 
assumption of normality, a bootstrapping technique was used when carrying out the 
multiple regression, in order to reduce the risk of Type I errors.  Correlations 
between the predictor variables are presented in table 8 and results for the multiple 
regression are shown in table 9.  As demonstrated, the variables were all significantly 
correlated. 





























Table 9.  Multiple regression using amended CFQ items 
 
 B SE B β 
Step 1 
   Constant (Depression) 
   Cognitive fusion - amended 
   Rumination 

















   Constant (Rumination) 
   Cognitive fusion - amended 














   Constant (Cognitive fusion) - 
amended 










 *p < .05     **p < .01     ***p < .001   
B = Beta coefficient  
SE B = Bootstrapped standard error  
β = Standardised beta coefficient 
NS = Not significant 
 
Note: R² = .85 for Step 1, ∆R² = .83 for Step 2, ∆R² = .08 for Step 3  
   
 
3.5.2  Path analysis using multiple regression 
The path model can be seen in figure 3.  Of note in the path analysis is the final error 
term for prediction of depression from the whole model, (1 – R²: e = 0.15).  This 
means that 85% of the variance in depression symptoms is accounted for by the 
variables included in this full model which incorporates amended CFQ scores.  This, 
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along with substantively similar relationships between variables (as expressed by the 
similar standardised beta coefficients between the variables), denotes a relatively 
similar model fit as the one depicted previously in figure 2.   
Figure 3.  Path analytic model of relationships between cognitive fusion (amended 
items), positive beliefs about rumination, rumination and depression 
    e = .17     e = .15 
Cognitive Fusion (CFQ-A)  
 
 
   .76***   .53*** 
 
.29*   Rumination  .38**  Depression  
          
   .18*   -.07 
 
 
Positive Beliefs About Rumination 
 
*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 
 
Again, the path model suggests that cognitive fusion does show a significant 
association with depression and that the impact of cognitive fusion upon depression 
severity is moderated by the presence of rumination.  However, it is understood that 
these are statistical associations and that this research design cannot infer causality. 
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Hypotheses 4 and 5: Re-exploration of the relationships between depression, 
rumination, positive beliefs about rumination and cognitive fusion 
A comparison of the direct paths in the new model reveals that cognitive fusion 
remains a very strong predictor of rumination (β = 0.76, p < .001) and a very strong 
predictor of depression scores (β = 0.53, p < .001).  This finding therefore continues 
to support hypothesis 4 in which it was predicted that cognitive fusion would 
significantly predict both rumination and depression symptoms.  In addition, 
rumination remains a predictor of depression symptoms (β = 0.38, p < .01).  The 
direct relationships between all other variables remain substantively the same, with 
positive beliefs about rumination being significantly correlated with cognitive fusion 
(β = 0.28, p < .05) and rumination (β = 0.18, p < .05) but not with depression 
symptoms (β = -0.07, p > .05). 
In terms of indirect pathways between the variables, the strength of the path from 
cognitive fusion, through rumination to depression (0.76 x 0.38 = 0.28; p < .05) is 
slightly strengthened within this new model.  The strength of the path from positive 
beliefs about rumination, through rumination to depression (0.18 x 0.38 = 0.07; p > 
.05) remains non-significant.  Again, findings regarding hypothesis 5 remain the 
same, with greater support for the predictions made by the ACT model than by the 
MCT model: The relationship between cognitive fusion, rumination and depression 
is stronger than the relationship between positive beliefs about rumination, 
rumination and depression.   
Finally, it is of note that with this re-analysis the final error term for prediction of 
depression from the whole model, (1 - R²: e = 0.15).  This means that 85% of the 
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variance in depression symptoms is accounted for by the variables included in this 
model.  This is an increase from the already large prediction of variance of 76% 
accounted for by the previous model.  However, again it must be emphasised that 
these are statistical associations and that this research design cannot infer causality.  
In conclusion, the secondary analysis goes some way to addressing a possible 
critique that the cognitive fusion measure (CFQ) and rumination scale (SRSQ) are 













Chapter 4: Discussion 
4.1  Summary of findings 
This study examined differences in cognitive fusion and positive beliefs about 
rumination between currently depressed, recovered depressed and never depressed 
controls.  As predicted, significant group differences were found, between all three 
groups, in levels of rumination and cognitive fusion.  Currently depressed 
participants endorsed significantly higher levels of rumination and cognitive fusion 
than recovered depressed participants who, in turn, endorsed significantly higher 
levels than never depressed participants.  However, contrary to expectation and to a 
previous research finding (Watkins & Moulds, 2005), group differences in positive 
metacognitive beliefs about rumination were only found between the currently 
depressed and never depressed groups.  No significant differences were found 
between either of these groups and the recovered depressed group in level of 
endorsement of positive beliefs about rumination i.e. the scores of those who were 
recovered depressed were between the two extreme groups and similar to both. 
An analysis of the whole sample revealed significant overall correlations between 
each of the variables, i.e. cognitive fusion, positive beliefs about rumination, 
rumination and depression, with only the relationship between positive beliefs about 
rumination and depression being non-significant.  In comparing the strength of the 
direct and indirect relationships or paths between the variables, it was found that the 
strongest direct paths were between cognitive fusion and rumination, and cognitive 
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fusion and depression.  Interestingly, a significant correlation between cognitive 
fusion and positive beliefs about depression was also found.   
The strongest indirect path was between cognitive fusion, rumination and depression, 
though this did not exceed the strength of the direct paths between these three 
variables.  The indirect path between positive beliefs about rumination, rumination 
and depression was not significant.  These findings support the proposal that 
cognitive fusion could be a fruitful process to target in treatment studies. 
Finally, the path analyses indicated that a high proportion of the variance in 
depression symptoms (i.e. over 75 per cent) within the whole sample could be 
accounted for by the variables in the model i.e. rumination, cognitive fusion and 
positive beliefs about rumination.  This was the case for both the analysis using the 
standard cognitive fusion measure, and the re-analysis using the adapted cognitive 
fusion results. 
 
4.2  Interpretation of findings 
4.2.1  Presence of cognitive fusion and links with rumination 
Overall, it would seem from this study that people who have recovered from 
depression (but not received any cognitive and/or behavioural psychological 
treatment), experience raised levels of rumination and cognitive fusion in comparison 
to people who have never experienced depression.  So, even though they are no 
longer clinically depressed, a difference in cognitive processes remains.  Indeed, both 
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diagnostic interviews and scores on the depression symptoms measure (CESD) 
demonstrated that those in the recovered depressed group were no longer 
experiencing a depressive disorder.  This may indicate that cognitive fusion is not 
secondary to depression and does appear to be implicated in the ruminative process.  
However, further studies using larger sample sizes and a prospective longitudinal 
design are required to draw more firm conclusions about this.  Within this study, the 
relationship between cognitive fusion and rumination, found within the overall 
sample, was stronger than any of the other relationships between the other variables 
tested.  This provides some support for the suggestion that cognitive fusion be 
considered in the conceptualisation of ruminative processes and depression. 
Within ACT and the RFT framework, it is proposed that rumination is a cognitive 
„reason-giving‟ strategy and that the more fused a person is with their thoughts, the 
more they will implement such strategies.  Rumination is therefore a thinking style 
which is adopted in response to cognitive fusion.  It is for this reason that the 
ordering of the variables was chosen in the path model presented (rather than, for 
example, placing them with cognitive fusion as the moderator between rumination 
and depression).  This abstraction was chosen as it reflected the direction of the 
relationships between variables as described by the literature.  However, it is also 
possible that the relationship between these two processes is bi-directional, and 
cognitive fusion also occurs in response to ruminative thinking.  Indeed, the direction 
of the relationship between these two variables cannot be determined by this study.  
Path analysis can evaluate correlational hypotheses but cannot establish the direction 
of causality.  However, the results do support the proposal that a relationship exists 
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between these two processes, with the effect size for this relationship being large 
(d=2.98).   
It is understood that some caution must be given to the finding within this study of a 
strong relationship between cognitive fusion and rumination: it is possible that this is 
a product of construct and measurement overlap.  As discussed earlier, within the 
literature about these cognitive processes, clear differences are indicated at the level 
of definition.  Rumination is defined as a perseverative, self-evaluative, negative 
thought process focused on mood, symptoms, and past regrets or perceived failures.  
In other words, rumination, as well as describing a type of repetitive thought process, 
is content specific.  The SRSQ, which is the self-report measure of rumination used 
in this study, certainly appears to define rumination in this way, as it measures the 
self-reported frequency of having certain content specific thoughts.   In contrast, 
within the literature reviewed, cognitive fusion is defined as a process in which 
people see thoughts as reasons for action, view thoughts as facts, see themselves as 
defined by (as opposed to separate from) their thoughts, and get caught up in their 
thoughts, struggling to distance themselves from them.  In other words, fusion is 
context specific: it refers to the relationship people have with their thoughts.  The 
CFQ, which is the self-report measure of cognitive fusion used in this study, defines 
cognitive fusion in this way.  Responders are asked to rate items about their 
relationship with their thoughts generally, rather than any particular thought content.  
It would therefore appear that, at the level of definition of the constructs which these 




However, in order to fully address this possibility of confounds between measures, it 
was necessary to analyse the CFQ in terms of face validity.  Analysis of item 
wording within the cognitive fusion measure highlighted that some items could 
potentially be argued to have confounds with general definitions of rumination.  For 
example, items such as „I find myself preoccupied with the future or past‟ could be 
interpreted as partly defining the type of thought content associated with rumination.  
By excluding any items from the full scale CFQ28 which potentially had confounds 
with rumination (13 items were excluded in total), and re-analysing the data, it was 
anticipated that criterion contamination would be reduced.  This new scale had a 
Cronbach‟s α = .902, indicating that even with the change in items it remains 
meaningful.  The finding that the strength of correlations between rumination and 
cognitive fusion were very similar in this re-analysis, with an effect size of d=2.76 
further supports the proposal that the correlation between cognitive fusion and 
rumination is not simply due to measurement overlap.   
The final possibility remains that there is conceptual overlap between rumination and 
cognitive fusion.  For example, it is possible that the SRSQ and the CFQ are simply 
measuring different aspects of the same construct, with entanglement/fusion being a 
part of what distinguishes rumination from „non-ruminative‟ thought processes, 
alongside the content and frequency of the thoughts.  In this sense, the definitions of 
rumination which prevail within the literature, which have largely been developed 
from Nolen-Hoeksema‟s (1991) response styles theory, may not fully describe the 
ruminative process.  Furthermore, the response styles questionnaire (from which the 
SRSQ originates) may not in essence be measuring the full ruminative construct, and 
may only be tapping into a specific component of this construct.  Already, the SRSQ 
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has been criticised in terms of content validity, for being heavily biased by 
depressive symptoms:  it is suggested that the scale does not purely measure a 
specific thought process, as items regarding symptom-based rumination are more 
related to previous symptoms of depression than to rumination (Conway et al., 
2000).  It has also been criticised for its overlap with the Beck Depression Inventory 
(BDI; Beck et al., 1979) and conceptual overlap with negative automatic thoughts 
has been suggested (Conway et al., 2000).  This is of note, as this is the measure 
which prevails within research on rumination.   However, this view has been 
challenged by studies which have found rumination as measured by the ruminative 
response scale questionnaire do predict depression even when negative cognitions 
are controlled, thus suggesting the constructs do not wholly overlap (e.g. Spasojevic 
& Alloy, 2001).  Clearly, the question of whether the process of rumination is 
captured in its entirety by measures such as the SRSQ remains open to debate.  It will 
therefore be necessary to consider future tangible research designs which could 
disambiguate the two processes of rumination and fusion in order to clarify whether 
they are distinct or if a problem exists with the definition of rumination, at the level 
of theory.  This will be discussed further in section 4.6. 
 
4.2.2  Presence of positive beliefs about rumination and links with 
rumination 
The finding that participants with depression endorsed more positive metacognitive 
beliefs about rumination than participants without depression was in keeping with 
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previous studies which have compared these two groups.  Within this study, the 
effect size for this group difference was d=0.75, which was smaller than in the only 
other study which has compared similar groups using the same adapted PBRS-A 
measure of positive beliefs (Watkins & Moulds, 2005, d=1.1).  However, the overall 
relationship found in the current study between rumination and such metacognitive 
beliefs was of similar effect size as previously found i.e. d= 0.87 as compared to 
d=0.97 found by Watkins and Moulds (2005).  Interestingly, Papageorgiou and Wells 
(2003) found differing effect sizes for the correlation between PBRS score and 
rumination score depending on the type of group used.  They reported effect sizes of 
d=0.65 for a large group of currently depressed individuals and d=1.42 for a large 
non-clinical group.  It would appear that the strength of the correlation between 
positive beliefs and rumination is affected by depression severity.  Overall, the 
correlation found within this current study between positive beliefs about rumination 
and levels of rumination supports the proposal that such beliefs are present in people 
who ruminate.  Yet, the lack of significant difference in levels of endorsement of 
positive beliefs between the currently depressed group and the recovered depressed 
group indicates that the further claim that positive beliefs about rumination 
contribute to the development of rumination cannot be supported.  If this were the 
case, a significant difference in this group would be anticipated, as it is known that 
recovered depressed patients are prone to rumination.   It is of note that this finding 
was not consistent with the one other study which has compared these three groups 
(Watkins & Moulds, 2005).  In Watkins and Moulds‟ (2005) study, the original 
positive beliefs about rumination scale (PBRS) and an adapted version (PBRS-A) 
were both used with all participants.  Unlike the original measure, the adapted 
116 
 
version makes no reference to either rumination or depression.  In Watkins and 
Moulds‟ study, differences in PBRS-A score between the never depressed group and 
the recovered depressed group were significant (p<.001; effect size d=1.09), as 
compared to this study in which differences between these groups were not (p>.05; 
effect size d=0.54).   Differences in the findings of this previous study and the 
current study regarding the between groups differences for PBRS-A score may be 
accounted for by the small sample size, which may have led to a Type II error.  With 
larger groups, the effect size may have been significant at the .05 level.  Further 
replication of the study with larger groups would clarify this matter.   
Another reason for the differences in findings may be due to the current study 
implementing only one measure of metacognitive beliefs about rumination.  Watkins 
and Moulds (2005) study may have suffered from some measurement contamination 
due to all participants completing both measures: the PBRS and the PBRS-A. 
Although the item wording has been amended in the PBRS-A, with the word 
„ruminating‟ being substituted for „thinking‟, and „my depression‟ being substituted 
with „my feelings‟, the items still resemble each other.  For example, the item 
„Thinking about the past helps me to prevent future mistakes and failures‟ remains 
similar to „Ruminating about the past helps me to prevent future mistakes and 
failures‟.  Participants may have attempted to respond to both apparently similar 
questionnaires in a consistent manner, thus appearing to strengthen the relationship 
between these two measures and, in turn, strengthening the relationship found in 
Watkins and Moulds‟ (2005) study between the PBRS-A and depression.  In effect, 
the study‟s attempt to reduce criterion contamination may have been impaired 
through its methodology and responder bias, and this current study‟s findings may be 
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a more accurate representation of the relationship between the PBRS-A and 
depression.  A replication of the study using a larger sample but with three similar 
groups, and the PBRS-A without the PBRS is necessary to clarify this issue. 
 
4.2.3  Links between cognitive fusion and positive beliefs about 
rumination 
It is of note that a significant correlation between positive beliefs about rumination 
and cognitive fusion was found.  Furthermore, the relationship was maintained even 
when adapted cognitive fusion data (in which items which were „rumination-like‟ 
were removed) was included in the re-analysis.  However, positive beliefs and 
cognitive fusion do not share a lot of variance in accounting for the presence of either 
rumination or depression.  This finding supports the suggestion that although the 
theoretical models from which these constructs arise differs, both appear to be 
implicated in some way in ruminative processes.   However, it remains unclear, due 
to the limitations of the current study design, to determine whether the relationship 
between cognitive fusion and positive beliefs about rumination is direct, or is the 
result of other mutual variables.   For example, it is proposed by the RFT model that 
reason-giving is itself a component of ruminative thought.  Metacognitive beliefs are 
also defined as a type of reason-giving for rumination.  The relationship found 
between cognitive fusion and positive beliefs about rumination may therefore simply 
reflect the relationship between cognitive fusion and rumination, with reason-giving 
being the mutual variable.  Another possibility is that, as suggested earlier, cognitive 
118 
 
fusion may be a component of a more comprehensive definition of rumination than 
that which is currently proposed at the level of theory.  In this case, the relationship 
between positive beliefs about rumination and cognitive fusion may simply be 
accounted for by the already established relationship between positive metacognitive 
beliefs and rumination.  As discussed already, it is clear that future research is 
required to clarify whether cognitive fusion and rumination are separate, distinct, 
constructs. 
It is acknowledged that interpretations of the data are somewhat speculative and, at 
this stage, we can only assume that rumination, cognitive fusion and positive beliefs 
about rumination are involved in depression, and that the model of these 
relationships which was chosen to test is supported by the data.  This is supported by 
the overall path analysis findings that a high proportion of the variance in depression 
symptoms within the whole sample could be accounted for by the presence of these 
variables in the model.  However, the results also indicated that, at the level of data 
fit, depression severity was best predicted by rumination and cognitive fusion rather 
than positive beliefs about rumination.  
 
4.3  Strengths and limitations of project 
The current study is limited by using a relatively small sample, although it did have 
adequate power to detect the effects reported.   However, a particular strength of this 
study was the inclusion of a clinical sample rather than simply using a non-clinical 
sample of higher frequency and lower frequency ruminators.  In their meta-analytic 
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review, Aldao et al. (2010) found that sample type was a significant moderator of 
problem solving, rumination, avoidance and suppression, with studies which 
included clinical participants showing stronger relationships between these variables 
and psychopathology, than in studies without clinical participants.  They concluded 
that the relationship between dispositional emotion-regulation strategies, such as 
rumination, and psychopathology may be stronger when more extreme groups are 
compared.  Furthermore, they suggested that this difference may be because non-
clinical populations are more likely to move flexibly between emotion-regulation 
strategies, and that this skill of flexibility is at least as important as the use of any one 
strategy in determining psychopathology (Aldao et al., 2010).  Therefore, studies 
which use only non-clinical populations would be less representative of the processes 
which take place in maintaining psychopathology, due to potential effects of 
psychological inflexibility being excluded.   
A particular strength of this study was the method by which groups were selected.  
All participants were screened using a clinical interview and a measure of depression 
symptomatology (CESD), which confirmed the „level of caseness‟ i.e. those in the 
recovered depressed group had been screened both through a diagnostic interview as 
no longer meeting criteria for MDD, and had scores on the CESD lower than the 
clinical depression cut-off of fifteen points.  This screening method provided 
certainty that distinct groups were being compared.   
Furthermore, the clinical sample recruited was typical of UK National Health Service 
Primary Care patients, and the results can therefore be relatively easily generalised to 
other similarly psychologically disordered individuals.  In addition, the inclusion of a 
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recovered depressed group who had not received any cognitive and/or behavioural 
psychological interventions in their treatment meant that conclusions drawn about 
the levels of rumination, positive beliefs about rumination and cognitive fusion in 
this group, as compared to the never depressed group, could be assumed to be 
unrelated to any specific interventions targeted at such processes.   
The use of self-report measures within this study must also be considered as a 
potential limitation.  Although use of these measures allowed for an initial 
exploration of the relationship between rumination, cognitive fusion and positive 
beliefs about rumination, the extent to which individuals can accurately self-report 
on their emotion regulation strategies (such as rumination) has been questioned 
(Robinson & Clore, 2002).  It may be the case that responding accurately to self-
report measures simply requires higher levels of insight and metacognition than all 
individuals are capable of.  Responses may be influenced by negative moods or self-
presentation biases, and responders may confound the experience of emotion with its 
regulation (Cole et al., 2004).   
Furthermore, the use of a retrospective questionnaire assessment within this study 
may also be a weakness.  The SRSQ requires participants to make retrospective 
reports on their responses to depressed mood, by asking them to self-rate how they 
respond at times when they feel low.  Retrospective assessment is known to be 
particularly vulnerable to bias and distortion (Stone et al., 1998).  However, the 
cognitive fusion measure and the positive beliefs about rumination measure are not 
retrospective and so are less vulnerable to such criticism.  Indeed, the results of the 
study clearly suggest that these processes are more prevalent in individuals with 
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depression.  A limitation of the study is that it cannot investigate how these processes 
interact with ruminative thinking moment to moment, in real-time settings, in 
response to experiences and mood fluctuations as they happen.  Future experimental 
studies into these processes, conducted in every-day settings, may therefore be more 
informative (Moberley & Watkins, 2008).   
Indeed, from an ACT perspective there may philosophically be questions around the 
use of psychometric techniques per se within a behavioural approach which describes 
itself as „functional contextual‟.  The use of questionnaires cannot account for the 
environments and contexts in which the behaviours measured occur.  However, it 
could be argued that what is being measured is the behaviour of the individual 
reporting on their sense of how true each statement is about their own behaviour.  In 
the example of responding to items within the cognitive fusion questionnaire, this is 
a proxy for actually measuring the individual overanalysing situations to the point 
where it is unhelpful to them.  Again, future experimental or diary studies may be 
beneficial.  However, problems within such alternative study designs would also 
have to be considered.  For example, it has been found that within experimental 
studies in which participants are instructed to use specific strategies such as 
rumination, some participants have great difficulty in doing so, and findings may 
therefore be biased by such difficulties (Demaree et al., 2006). 
A final obvious limitation of this study is in the use of a cross-sectional design and 
the subsequent use of a multiple regression path model in analysing the overall 
relationships between the variables.  Within a given path diagram, path analysis can 
highlight more significant paths and can indicate, between two correlational 
122 
 
hypotheses, which path is best supported by the data, according to the relative sizes 
of path coefficients.  However, the analysis remains associative and definitive 
statements about causality cannot be made.  Furthermore, path analysis cannot tell us 
whether there is a mutual dependence on other unknown variables, i.e. variables that 
are not included in the initial study or analysis.  The results of this study have 
therefore been interpreted with caution.  However, it is apparent that the evidence 
presented in this study strongly supports the presence of these cognitive processes in 
the experience of depression, as demonstrated by the overall level of variance in 
depression symptoms which is accounted for by the variables included in the path 
model. 
 
4.4  Theoretical implications 
Perhaps the most important theoretical contribution of this study is the finding that 
cognitive fusion in particular appears to play a significant role in both rumination and 
depression.  This finding supports the proposal by ACT that cognitive fusion is 
implicated in psychopathology (Hayes, 2004).  Furthermore, the data fit for the level 
of variance in depression symptoms which was accounted for by the variables of 
rumination, positive beliefs about rumination, and cognitive fusion was high.  This 




4.4.1  Understanding the role of thought content and thought context in 
depression 
The measure of rumination used in this study has already been discussed as being 
content-specific, tapping into the frequency with which particular depression-specific 
thoughts are experienced, whereas the measure of cognitive fusion is concerned with 
the process issue of an individual‟s relationship to their thoughts.  Interestingly, it is 
the shifting emphasis from treatment interventions focussing on thought content to 
interventions focussing on thought process which has occupied more recent 
developments within psychological therapy.  This is apparent both within 
mindfulness and acceptance based therapies, such as acceptance and commitment 
therapy (ACT) in which techniques aimed at cognitive defusion are used, and within 
cognitive therapies, such as metacognitive therapy (MCT) in which techniques aimed 
at changing underlying metacognitive beliefs about rumination are used.  It is 
apparent within various theoretical accounts that the interplay between content and 
process is crucial in the understanding of psychopathology.   In the case of 
depression, the findings of this study support the suggestion that an important aspect 
of this interplay is between depression-specific ruminative thinking and cognitive 





4.4.2  Understanding the role of cognitive fusion and positive beliefs 
about rumination in rumination and depression 
From a metacognitive perspective, the S-REF model (Wells & Matthews, 1994, 
1996) does not explicitly detail why a person‟s relationship with their ruminative 
thoughts (e.g. cognitive fusion) would be implicated in depression.  However, it is 
possible that cognitive fusion is implicated in several of the activities which are 
collectively known as the cognitive-attentional syndrome (CAS), which is suggested 
by the S-REF model to contribute to emotional disorder and relapse.  Some of the 
activities within this CAS, such as attentional bias and reduced efficiency of 
cognitive functioning, could also be argued to be supported by, or consequences of, 
cognitive fusion.  Because activation of metacognitions is also a component of the 
CAS, the relationship between cognitive fusion and metacognitions may be 
explained by the S-REF model‟s proposal that all such processes are involved in 
emotional disorder, such as depression.  In other words, the relationship between 
cognitive fusion and positive beliefs about rumination is not direct but is the result of 
other mediating or moderating variables. Therefore, although not addressed by the S-
REF model, the implication of cognitive fusion in rumination and depression is not 
entirely incompatible with the model.   
From an ACT perspective, the role of cognitive fusion and positive beliefs about 
rumination in accounting for a large proportion of the variance in depression 
symptoms within this study may be accounted for by the ACT proposal that fusion is 
related to „reason-giving‟ processes.  Positive beliefs about rumination, as defined by 
both the PBRS and PBRS-A items, are forms of reason-giving: not for depression, 
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but for a particular thinking style.  It is proposed by ACT that reason-giving is itself a 
component of ruminative thought (Zettle, 2007).  From an ACT perspective, the 
relationship found in this study between cognitive fusion and positive beliefs about 
rumination may be indirect, with reason-giving being the mutual variable.   
Again it is acknowledged that such interpretations are speculative.  However, the 
above models suggest a range of testable hypotheses which could be explored in 
future studies.  
 
4.5  Clinical implications 
4.5.1  Assessment of cognitive fusion and beliefs about rumination 
The results of this study suggest that routine enquiry regarding the beliefs people 
hold about their thinking style, particularly rumination, and the level of fusion they 
have with their thoughts should be integrated into the psychological assessment of 
those experiencing depression.  In doing so, it may be possible to target interventions 
towards factors which are potentially implicated in rumination.  Given the literature 
reviewed regarding the role of rumination in the onset, maintenance and recurrence 
of depression, it is predicted that treatments that alter rumination would have a large 





4.5.2  Cognitive fusion interventions 
Furthermore, given the finding of this study of a strong correlation between cognitive 
fusion and rumination and cognitive fusion and depression, it seems possible that 
strategies impacting on one will also impact on the other.  It has been suggested that 
an experiential type of self-focused attention, rather than an analytic perseverative 
type, is a more useful activity for people experiencing depression (Watkins & 
Teasdale, 2001, 2004).  It is possible that addressing cognitive fusion may promote 
this more experiential self-focus.   
As previously described, cognitive defusion techniques are a central part of ACT 
interventions. Techniques which address defusion are intended to create a „de-fused‟ 
perspective on psychological content, reducing entanglement with thoughts and 
promoting the perception that “I am not my thoughts”.  However, as discussed, 
empirical evidence regarding the effectiveness of these specific approaches is 
limited.  The findings of this study  highlight that further laboratory based research 
which evaluates cognitive defusion interventions is warranted.    
 
4.5.3  Metacognitive interventions 
The use of techniques to address underlying metacognitions which support 
rumination already forms a component of MCT for depression.  Within MCT it is 
proposed that in altering such metacognitions, the use of rumination is reduced 
which, in turn, reduces depression.  However, component analysis of the precise role 
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of changing metacognitions in reducing rumination has not yet been carried out and 
empirical evidence regarding the effectiveness of approaches which specifically 
target metacognitions are also limited.  In addition, the results of this study suggest 
that efforts to modify positive metacognition about rumination may be relatively less 
effective as a treatment for depression than the development of defusion based 
strategies.  However, replication of this study with larger samples is required before 
any firm conclusions can be made regarding the relative roles of cognitive fusion and 
metacognition in rumination and depression.  Again, it is also clear that further 
laboratory based research which evaluates interventions targeting metacognition is 
warranted.    
 
4.5.4  Potential clinical incompatibility 
It is important to highlight that although both cognitive fusion and metacognitive 
beliefs are indicated within the current study on rumination, an integrative approach 
to clinical intervention is not necessarily advised.  The theoretical models 
underpinning ACT approaches and MCT approaches are different and although some 
potential overlap has been highlighted, the models do not necessarily support the use 
of different clinical interventions.  For example, it is proposed within RFT, which 
underpins ACT, that attempts to change key nodes in cognitive networks is counter-
productive as it creates a context that tends to elaborate the network in that area and 
increase the functional importance of these nodes (Barnes-Holmes, 2004).  In other 
words, using verbal challenging and restructuring of underlying metacognitions 
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which support rumination, may be counter-productive as they would ultimately serve 
to elaborate unhelpful verbal processes i.e. they would make control of thoughts as a 
method for controlling emotion and behaviour more central, resulting in individuals 
becoming more „stuck‟ or „fused‟, rather than less.  This suggests that within an ACT 
treatment model, it is preferable to focus on the function of cognitive networks rather 
than the content of them, in clinical interventions.  Again, this is an area of debate 
which is ongoing and it is likely that, until further clarity is brought about by both 
outcome studies and component analysis studies, it is the preference of the patient 
and the therapist which will determine whether interventions which target rumination 
that are grounded in one model are selected over another. 
 
4.6  Future research directions 
4.6.1  Cognitive fusion research 
It is apparent that a wide range of research questions remain to be answered and the 
possibilities for developing on the work of this study are numerous.  In the first 
instance, it is of note that this is the first study exploring the role of cognitive fusion 
(rather than just „believability of thoughts‟) in rumination and depression.  As such, 
similar studies using larger sample sizes are needed to provide support for the 
findings of the study that cognitive fusion, as measured by the CFQ, is related to 
depression.  Furthermore, future studies with prospective longitudinal designs are 
needed to establish the temporal relationships between cognitive fusion, rumination 
and depression.  That is, to clarify whether individuals with pre-existing high levels 
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of cognitive fusion are more likely to engage in rumination when depressed, or 
whether individuals with pre-existing high levels of rumination are more likely to 
become more fused with their thoughts when depressed.   
In order to disambiguate between the two processes of rumination and fusion, 
experimental studies using the rumination induction developed by Nolen-Hoeksema 
and Morrow (1993),  could be carried out.  This would allow the researcher to 
instigate rumination in participants and then assess the degree of cognitive fusion 
produced.  A comparison between participants who had undergone a prior positive 
mood induction versus a negative mood induction could be made.  It may be that 
cognitive fusion and rumination are synonymous, or that they are distinct processes 
which overlap.  Regardless, further exploration is warranted.  As stated by Raes and 
colleagues (2008): „...distinguishing different components in rumination is of great 
importance in furthering our understanding of the precise relationship between 
rumination and depression and the mechanisms underlying this association‟ (p.538.).  
Such experimental studies may also help to disentangle the causal relationship 
between fusion and rumination.  It is proposed that if they are separate constructs, it 
would be possible to alter the level of cognitive fusion whilst, in the short term, the 
level of rumination remains the same.  Another potential study design would be to 
compare two groups of high or low ruminators.  Similar to Moulds and colleagues‟ 
(2010) experimental study on rumination, one of three possible conditions could then 
be applied across both groups: a laboratory-based stressor involving negative 
feedback on a forced-failure anagram task, positive feedback on the task, or no 
feedback on the task.  Baseline measures of cognitive fusion could be taken and it 
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could then be observed whether those with higher baseline levels of fusion reported 
higher rumination following the task, even when controlling for baseline rumination.   
Due to the relationship the two processes are proposed to have, the use of cognitive 
defusion techniques would be expected to lower levels of rumination in the longer 
term.  Outcome studies of specific cognitive defusion techniques could also be used 
in order to compare pre and post measures of rumination and cognitive fusion.  In 
this way, outcome studies may determine if cognitive defusion strategies can 
successfully moderate rumination, and whether such moderation is beneficial in 
treating depression i.e. whether changes in cognitive fusion mediate changes in 
symptoms.  The CFQ28 could also be used as an outcome measure in rumination 
focussed treatment studies.   
There is also scope for myriad studies exploring potential interacting variables 
between cognitive fusion and depression.  As already stated, the current study cannot 
determine whether the relationship found between cognitive fusion and depression is 
direct or mediated by other factors.  One potential mutual variable linking cognitive 
fusion and depression, proposed by ACT theory, is avoidance behaviours.  It is 
suggested that the avoidance of private experiences is detrimental because it prevents 
individuals from responding to aversive stimuli and often has the paradoxical effect 
of increasing avoided material (Hayes et al., 1999; Wenzlaff & Wenger, 2000).  High 
ruminators may avoid the private experience of negative affect through rumination 
and in so doing may actually worsen their negative mood.  Moulds and colleagues 
(2007) suggest that rumination promotes focus on this disorder-specific material and, 
consistent with theories about worry, rumination functions to limit the emotional 
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impact of negative material and/or to limit contact with the environment.  In other 
words, rumination functions as experiential and/or behavioural avoidance: it is an 
avoidant coping strategy.  Support for this link between rumination and avoidance 
has arisen from various studies.  For example, it has been found that rumination 
relates to delayed response to symptoms of breast cancer, which supports the 
hypothesis that high ruminating individuals avoid dealing with emotionally 
threatening material (Lyubomirsky et al., 2006).  In another study, it has been found 
that individuals that engage in (rumination-like) post-event processing tend to avoid 
social situations that are similar to the one that initiated rumination (Rachman et al., 
2000).  Rumination has also been linked to increased alcohol abuse, which can be 
viewed as an emotional avoidance strategy (Nolen-Hoeksema & Harrell, 2002).  In 
order to explore this further, measures of avoidance such as the Cognitive-
Behavioural Avoidance Scale (CBAS; Ottenbreit & Dobson, 2004) could be included 
in future studies.    
Finally, although studied within the context of major depressive disorder, processes 
such as rumination are trans-diagnostic and can be found in other clinical 
populations.  For example higher levels of rumination and beliefs about the benefits 
of rumination have been found in patients with Anorexia Nervosa as compared with 
non-clinical controls (Rawal et al., 2010).  This indicates that future research into 
cognitive fusion and rumination within other clinical populations may also be useful 





4.6.2  Metacognition research 
As with cognitive fusion, future studies with prospective longitudinal designs are 
needed to establish the temporal relationships between metacognitive beliefs about 
rumination, rumination and depression.  That is, to clarify whether individuals with 
pre-existing high levels of such metacognitions are more likely to engage in 
rumination when depressed, or whether individuals with pre-existing high levels of 
rumination are more likely to then endorse beliefs which support the use of 
rumination, when depressed.  It is proposed by the metacognitive model that positive 
beliefs about rumination are a vulnerability factor for rumination.  To support this 
hypothesis it would be necessary to show that such beliefs are antecedent to, and 
predictive of, future rumination or depression.  In addition, experimental studies 
manipulating metacognitions and then examining the degree of rumination produced 
in response to a subsequent negative event may help to disentangle the causal 
relationship between metacognitions and rumination. 
In order to assess the specific impact of metacognitions on rumination and 
depression, analytical examinations of processes which target these beliefs require 
further assessment.  Until now, research has focused on overall treatment outcomes 
for entire treatment packages which target multiple components, including attention.  
Conclusions about the role of metacognition in maintaining rumination can therefore 





4.6.3  Combined research 
As previously discussed, it may be the case that rumination, metacognitions and 
cognitive fusion are linked by other common factors, rather than having direct 
relationships.  For example, from an ACT perspective, the relationship found in this 
study between cognitive fusion and positive beliefs about rumination may be 
indirect, with reason-giving being the mutual variable.  Further cross-sectional 
studies which include such variables would allow for the exploration of such 
hypotheses.  This was not carried out in the current study due to a need to limit the 
response burden for participants.  However, future studies may simply use self-report 
measures of depression symptomatology, rather than the more detailed but lengthier 
diagnostic interview used in this study: Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV 
(SCID; First et al, 1997).  This would allow time for other measures to be included, 
such as the reasons for depression questionnaire (RFD; Addis et al., 1995).   
 
4.7  Summary 
In conclusion, the results of this research project suggest that the further development 
of research into cognitive fusion and cognitive defusion techniques is likely to 
provide a valuable contribution in clarifying processes which aid reduction of 
depression.  In addition, it may be the case that by gaining greater understanding of 
the relationship between cognitive fusion and rumination, additional techniques can 
be targeted at reducing the impact of cognitive processes which are known to 
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promote the recurrence of depression.  It is hoped that this study provides a useful 
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Appendix M:  Cognitive Fusion Questionnaire – short version 
(CFQ13) 
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